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COMMENTS
Protecting the Lydias, Linas, and Tinas from Sex
Trafficking: A Call to Eliminate Ambiguities of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1591
I. Introduction
To honor the 200th anniversary of the “most glorious measure that had
ever been adopted by any legislative body in the world”1 and its champion,
William Wilberforce, the 110th Congress passed the William Wilberforce
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA).2
William Wilberforce, the Act’s namesake, fought tirelessly for over
eighteen years to pass the first piece of legislation aimed at ending slavery
in Great Britain, the Slave Trade Act of 1807.3 Wilberforce spoke about the
horrors inflicted upon those torn from their homes and subjected to the
“arbitrary will and wanton caprice of others.”4 Inspired by his passionate
words that “[n]ever, never will we desist until we extinguish every trace of
this bloody traffic to which our posterity, looking back to the history of
those enlightened times, will scarce believe that it has been suffered to exist
so long to disgrace and dishonor this country,”5 Congress embraced
Wilberforce’s legacy in the fight to end modern-day slavery with the
passage of the TVPRA.6
Although abolished by the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865,7 slavery, or,
as it is known today, human trafficking, remains a prevalent issue as the
second-largest criminal industry in the world, totaling over thirty-two
billion dollars in market value.8 Sex trafficking, defined as forcing or

1. WILLIAM HAGUE, WILLIAM WILBERFORCE: THE LIFE OF THE GREAT ANTI-SLAVE
TRADE CAMPAIGNER, at xvii (2007) (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044; Slave Trade Act of 1807, 47 Geo. 3, sess. 1, ch. 36.
3. HAGUE, supra note 1, at xv-xviii.
4. Id. at xvi.
5. 154 CONG. REC. H10902 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 2008) (statement of Rep. Smith).
6. See William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of
2008, 122 Stat. at 5069.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
8. Sex Trafficking, INT’L JUST. MISSION, 1, http://www.ijm.org/sites/default/files/
resources/Factsheet-Sex-Trafficking.pdf (last visited May 29, 2013).
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coercing a person to engage in a commercial sex act, constitutes 43% of
human trafficking in the world.9
Sex traffickers target vulnerable people to traffic and exploit.10 Lina, age
thirteen, and Sinan, age sixteen, were best friends who struggled to find
work to help support their families.11 They took odd jobs when they could,
but often went hungry when work was unavailable and money was scarce.12
Desperate to find work, Lina and Sinan jumped at the opportunity brought
to them by Sinan’s aunt to work in a coffee shop.13 Unfortunately, Sinan’s
aunt lied and trafficked the girls into a brothel.14
While Sinan managed to escape, Lina was held captive in the brothel.15
Like the other women and girls trapped there, Lina was beaten, forced to
drink as much alcohol as the customers, and raped repeatedly, day after
day—until she was rescued by Sinan.16 Lina’s story, unfortunately, is a
common one.17 Sex traffickers often use lies and false promises of work to
lure young women and children into sex trafficking.18
Lydia, instead of being tricked like Lina and Sinan, was kidnapped.19
With promises of finding work as a model, Lydia, age sixteen, met a
woman for dinner one night.20 The after-dinner drink proved devastating.21
Lydia awoke the next day, after being drugged the night before, to find
herself in a terrifying situation.22 She was told that she was now in a foreign

9. Human Trafficking: The Facts, UNITED NATIONS, 1, http://www.unglobalcompact
.org/docs/issues_doc/labour/Forced_labour/HUMAN_TRAFFICKING_-_THE_FACTS__final.pdf (last visited May 29, 2013).
10. Sex Trafficking in the U.S., POLARIS PROJECT, http://www.polarisproject.org/humantrafficking/sex-trafficking-in-the-us (last visited May 29, 2013).
11. IJM Cambodia: Brave Survivors Help Rescue Girls from Brothel, INT’L JUST.
MISSION (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.ijm.org/news/ijm-cambodia-brave-survivors-helprescue-girls-brothel.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See Sex Trafficking in the U.S., supra note 10.
18. Id.
19. 146 CONG. REC. H2675, H2683 (May 9, 2000) (statement of Rep. Smith) Lydia’s
story is “an amalgamation of several true stories of women and girls who have been
trafficked in Eastern Europe in recent years.” Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See id.
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country and was the property of a man.23 That man threatened her, took
away her passport and immigration documents, and convinced her that she
was in debt to his agency for $35,000.24 When Lydia rebelled, the man beat
her, raped her, allowed other men to gang-rape her, and deprived her of
food and water for three days.25 She was prostituted for six months before
the local police raided the brothel.26 Because she did not have immigration
papers, Lydia was arrested and placed in prison before someone eventually
recognized her as a trafficking victim.27
Children like Lydia and Lina are especially vulnerable to being
trafficked.28 Traffickers can easily manipulate children by making a child
believe that she29 is loved—by giving her attention—only to coerce the
child into commercial sex activity by promising what the child perceives to
be love and attention.30
Tina met a man who courted her and convinced her that he loved her.31
He then persuaded her to move to Ohio with him.32 She was fourteen years
old at the time.33 Upon arriving, he explained that she had to prove she
loved him by “working” the streets so they could have their dream home.34
When she resisted, he had his friends rape her.35 He then told her she could
have avoided the rape if she had simply done what he had said.36 Tina was
forced to walk the streets nightly, engaging in prostitution.37 If she did not

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See Tina Frundt, Enslaved in America: Sex Trafficking in the United States,
WOMEN’S FUNDING NETWORK, http://www.womensfundingnetwork.org/resource/pastarticles/enslaved-in-america-sex-trafficking-in-the-united-states (last visited May 30, 2013).
29. For ease of writing, the author uses the female pronouns in reference to victims
because the majority of children trafficked are young girls. However, sex trafficking is a
significant problem that affects both genders. See Sex Trafficking, supra note 8 (noting that
80% of victims are female).
30. See Frundt, supra note 28.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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meet her nightly quota, she was repeatedly beaten, denied food, and locked
in a closet.38
These stories only tell the tales of three of the two million children, both
in the United States and worldwide, who are taken from their homes each
year and forced into the commercial sex trade.39 In its fight against this
horrendous problem, Congress passed the Trafficking Victims Protection
Act of 2000 (TVPA).40 Eight years later, the TVPRA expanded on the
original TVPA, embracing the goals established to provide a
comprehensive approach to ending modern day slavery.41 Those goals
focused on the three “Ps”: protection, prevention and prosecution.42
Protection efforts are aimed at creating programs focused on providing
shelter, food, legal support, and psychological care to identified trafficking
victims.43 Victims who are not United States citizens may be eligible for
temporary residence visas.44 Once victims are identified, the Department of
Health and Human Services assists them in securing educational and
vocational opportunities so that they do not fall prey to trafficking again.45
However, in order to receive the protection needed, the person must first be
recognized as a trafficking victim.46 Because a trafficking victim often does
not view herself as such, victims are often identified, if at all, by law
enforcement officers or nongovernmental organizations that come into
contact with the victim.47
Programs established to meet Congress’s goal of prevention focus on
identifying victims by increasing public awareness.48 Training programs
38. Id.
39. Sex Trafficking, supra note 8.
40. Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464.
41. See William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044, 5069; Fact Sheet: Child Victims of Human
Trafficking, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Aug. 8, 2012), http://www.
acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/resource/fact-sheet-child-victims-of-human-trafficking.
42. Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, § 102(a), 114 Stat. at 1466.
43. See id. § 102(b), 114 Stat. at 1466-69 (describing the inadequacies and lack of
protection efforts and the goal of the legislation); see also id. at § 102(b)(24), 114 Stat. at
1469.
44. Id. § 107(c)(3), 114 Stat. at 1477.
45. Id. § 107(b)(1), 114 Stat. at 1475-76.
46. Id. § 107(b)(1)(A), 114 Stat. at 1475.
47. HEATHER J. CLAWSON & NICOLE DUTCH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
IDENTIFYING VICTIMS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING: INHERENT CHALLENGES AND PROMISING
STRATEGIES FROM THE FIELD 3-4 (2007), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/07/human
trafficking/IdentVict/ib.pdf.
48. Fact Sheet: Child Victims of Human Trafficking, supra note 41.
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target those who may come in contact with a trafficking victim: law
enforcement, medical personnel, nongovernmental organizations, and social
workers, among others.49 These programs train personnel how to identify a
trafficking victim, how to interact with that person, and how to secure the
needed help, from food and shelter to psychological care.50
To effectuate the goal of “just and effective punishment of traffickers,”51
Congress established criminal statutes and provided prosecution tools for
both federal and state agencies.52 Congress identified two severe forms of
sex trafficking as: (1) causing anyone to commit a commercial sex act
through force, fraud, or coercion, or (2) causing a person under the age of
eighteen years to commit a commercial sex act.53 The criminalization of
severe forms of sex trafficking is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1591.54
Congress formally amended 18 U.S.C. § 1591 in the TVPRA, adding
reckless disregard as a sufficient mens rea and adding a special evidentiary
provision for the government when prosecuting severe forms of sex
trafficking.55 The evidentiary provision in § 1591(c), addressing the mens
rea requirement of the victim’s status as a minor,56 has been subject to
varying interpretations.57 One court held that this provision allowed the
government to prove the mens rea of the victim’s age in one of three
alternatives—by proving that the defendant either (a) knew the victim’s
age, (b) recklessly disregarded the victim’s age, or (c) merely had a
reasonable opportunity to observe.58 Another court held that when the
government prosecutes under the reckless disregard standard, the
government must prove an additional element—that the defendant had a
reasonable opportunity to observe the victim.59 Aiming to increase the

49. CLAWSON & DUTCH, supra note 47, at 4.
50. Id. at 4-5.
51. Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, § 102(a), 114 Stat. at 1466.
52. See id; see also id. § 112, 114 Stat. at 1486-90.
53. 22 U.S.C. § 7102(9) (2012).
54. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2012); see also Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act of 2011, H.R. 2830, 112th Cong. § 212 (2011) (proposing a name
change of 18 U.S.C. § 1591 to “severe forms of trafficking”).
55. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-457, sec. 222, § 1591, 122 Stat. 5044, 5069.
56. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c).
57. See United States v. Robinson, 702 F.3d 22, 30-34 (2d Cir. 2012); United States v.
Wilson, No. 10-60102-CR, 2010 WL 2991561, at *7 (S.D. Fla. July 27, 2010).
58. Robinson, 702 F.3d at 34.
59. Wilson, 2010 WL 2991561, at *6-7.
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number of prosecutions of sex traffickers,60 Congress inadvertently
hindered its goal of prosecution by passing an ambiguous statute.
The ambiguity arising from the alternative interpretations of 18 U.S.C. §
1591 can have a detrimental effect on all three of Congress’s goals.
Prosecutors may elect to avoid prosecuting under this statute while the law
remains unsettled.61 Or the prosecutor may charge the defendant under a
different statute, creating unintended negative consequences for both the
victim and the fight to end sex trafficking.62
If the perpetrator is not prosecuted as a sex trafficker, the victim may be
less likely to be recognized as a trafficking victim.63 This identification is
crucial for determination of eligibility for federally funded programs, such
as immigration services.64 In addition, non-identification may cause the
victim to lose her right to mandatory restitution for trafficking victims
under 18 U.S.C. § 1593.65
Prosecuting sex traffickers under an offense that carries a lighter
punishment may also decrease the probability that a victim will testify or
cooperate with the prosecution, which significantly reduces the likelihood
of success.66 Because of the heinous methods of control that sex traffickers

60. See AMY FARRELL ET AL., NE. UNIV. INST. ON RACE & JUSTICE, UNDERSTANDING AND
IMPROVING LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSES TO HUMAN TRAFFICKING: FINAL REPORT 22 (June
2008), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/222752.pdf.
61. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-27.230 (2009),
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/27mcrm.htm
#9-27.230. Federal prosecutors are given broad discretion in choosing when and how to
prosecute and under which laws. Id. Logically, prosecutors consider ease of prosecution
under a particular statute as well as the prosecutor’s familiarity with a particular statute when
selecting under which statute to charge. See, e.g., Alicia W. Peters, Trafficking in Meaning:
Law, Victims, and the State 87 (2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia
University), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/231589.pdf.
62. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 22-2705(c)(2) (2010) (not imposing a minimum mandatory
sentence for causing a minor to engage in prostitution). But see 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(1)-(2)
(2012) (imposing a mandatory minimum sentence of ten to fifteen years imprisonment,
conditional on the age of the minor).
63. See Linda Smith & Samantha Healy Vardaman, A Legislative Framework for
Combating Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking, 23 REGENT U. L. REV. 265, 278-79 (2010)
(discussing the ramifications for charging sex traffickers under non-trafficking statutes); see
also Fact Sheet: Child Victims of Human Trafficking, supra note 41.
64. 22 U.S.C. § 7105(b)(1)(A), (C) (2012) (addressing certification as human trafficking
victims in order to receive services); see also Smith & Vardaman, supra note 63, at 287.
65. 18 U.S.C. § 1593.
66. Combating Modern Slavery: Reauthorization of Anti-Trafficking Programs:
Hearing on H.R. 3887 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 95 (2007).
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exert over their victims,67 victims are often terrified of testifying against
perpetrators.68 This fear is amplified if the victim knows that the perpetrator
will not be subject to a significant prison term because the perpetrator is
charged with a lesser offense.69 Charging perpetrators with lesser offenses
frequently results in shorter prison sentences.70 Because of the
psychological terror that the trafficker instills in the victim, the victim will
fear that the trafficker will return to traffic her once more or that he will
harm her family once he is released from prison.71
Finally, by charging the perpetrator under a lesser offense, efforts aimed
at decreasing the demand in the commercial sex industry and, therefore,
decreasing the frequency of sex trafficking, are wasted.72 Sex trafficking is
the second-largest criminal industry in the world because it is so
profitable.73 Without imposing significant risks on the perpetrators, such as

67. Sex traffickers impose fear in their victims through a systematic process known as
“grooming.” Domestic Sex Trafficking: Criminal Operations of the American Pimp, POLARIS
PROJECT 3, http://www.polarisproject.org/resources/resources-by-topic/sex-trafficking (scroll
through .pdf documents; then select “Domestic Sex Trafficking”) (last visited July 10,
2013). Methods of grooming include beating, burning, and raping the victim as well as
emotional abuse, removing the victim from family and friends, and creating an environment
where the victim must depend on the perpetrator. Id. Traffickers often impose a fear of law
enforcement which may impair a victim’s ability to report or testify. Id.
68. Combating Modern Slavery: Reauthorization of Anti-Trafficking Programs:
Hearing on H.R. 3887 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 66, at 76 (statement
of Dorchen A. Leidholt, Director, Sanctuary for Families’ Ctr. for Battered Women’s Legal
Servs.).
69. Id. at 94 (statement of Ms. Florrie Burkey, Safe Haven).
70. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 22-2705(c)(2) (2010) (not imposing a minimum mandatory
sentence for causing a minor to engage in prostitution). But see 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(1)-(2)
(imposing mandatory minimum sentence of ten to fifteen years imprisonment, conditional on
the age of the minor); see also SHARED HOPE INT’L, PROTECTED INNOCENCE CHALLENGE:
STATE REPORT CARDS ON THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF PROTECTION FOR THE NATION’S
CHILDREN: 2012, at 117-219, available at http://sharedhope.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/
09/ProtectedInnocenceChallenge_Final_2012_web2.pdf (providing a state-by-state analysis
of sex trafficking laws, including each state’s criminal statutes and punishment ranges).
71. Combating Modern Slavery: Reauthorization of Anti-Trafficking Programs:
Hearing on H.R. 3887 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 66, at 76 (statement
of Dorchen A. Leidholt, Director, Sanctuary for Families’ Ctr. for Battered Women’s Legal
Servs.).
72. Smith & Vardaman, supra note 63, at 267-68 (discussing supply and demand
principles in the commercial sex industry).
73. Sex Trafficking, supra note 8.
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lengthy prison terms, the profits of sex trafficking remain as powerful
incentives because the corresponding risk is not perceived to be that great.74
In order to combat sex trafficking effectively, Congress’s goals of
protection, prevention, and prosecution must work in unison.75 Because
prosecution goals are hindered by an ambiguous statute, both the protection
and prevention goals are also impeded.76 As a result, 18 U.S.C. § 1591 must
be amended so that prosecutors can effectively charge and prosecute sex
traffickers, slowing the pace of the world’s fastest growing criminal
industry: human trafficking.77
In Part II, this comment applies traditional statutory interpretation
methods to 18 U.S.C. § 1591 in an attempt to determine its meaning. Part
III discusses the repercussions of the ambiguity inherent in § 1591 on
Congress’s goals of prevention, protection, and prosecution, as well as the
impact on state anti-human trafficking programs. Part IV presents the
arguments for and against holding a defendant strictly liable for the crime
of sex trafficking of minors. Part V proposes changes to § 1591 that
eliminate the ambiguities found in the current statute and, in turn, lead to
more effective prosecutions of sex traffickers.
II. Determining the Meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1591
Inspired by the heart-wrenching stories of children forced into
prostitution, occurring daily both abroad and in the United States, Congress
passed the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000.78 Through this Act,
Congress authorized the Department of Justice to prosecute those who
commit sex trafficking of children by force, fraud, or coercion.79 Under this
version of the statute, the prosecution was required to prove the defendant
knew the victim was less than eighteen years of age.80
When § 1591(a) was amended in 2008, Congress added reckless
disregard as an alternative mens rea for proof the perpetrator caused a

74. See generally Smith & Vardaman, supra note 63 (discussing the need for a strong
legislative framework in order to affect the supply and demand in the commercial sex
industry).
75. See 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(24) (2012).
76. FARRELL ET AL., supra note 60, at 22.
77. Sex Trafficking, supra note 8.
78. See Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat.
1464.
79. Id. § 112(a)(2), 114 Stat. at 1487.
80. See id.
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minor to engage in a commercial sex act.81 A special evidentiary provision
was added to § 1591(c),82 stating that in a prosecution under § 1591(a), the
government need not prove the defendant knew the person caused to
engage in a commercial sex act was under the age of eighteen years if the
defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the person.83 These
amendments left prosecution and defense lawyers asking several questions.
What does the government have to prove regarding the age of the minor?
Must the government prove the defendant knew the victim’s age or that the
defendant recklessly disregarded the victim’s age? Or rather, must the
government only show that the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to
observe the victim? Furthermore, what circumstances establish a
“reasonable opportunity to observe”?
A. Applying Traditional Methods of Statutory Interpretation to 18 U.S.C. §
1591
To answer these questions, prosecution and defense teams must consider
how a court might interpret the statute.84 Traditional interpretation methods
are most likely to be applied, including analyzing the plain language of the
statute, reviewing the legislative history of the TVPA and its amendments,
evaluating the common statutory scheme of federal sex crimes against
children, and exploring the constitutional implications of the alternative
interpretations.
1. Plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 1591
Courts approach statutory interpretation by first considering the language
of the statute itself.85 If the meaning of the statute is clear, “that language
must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.”86 Ordinary grammatical rules
apply.87

81. See William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, sec. 222, § 1591(a), 122 Stat. 5044, 5069.
82. Prior to 2008, subsection (c) provided definitions for a variety of words found in the
sex trafficking statutes. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c) (Supp. II 2008).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c) (2012).
84. RONALD BENTON BROWN & SHARON JACOBS BROWN, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
THE SEARCH FOR LEGISLATIVE INTENT 7-8 (2002).
85. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980).
86. Id.
87. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (citing
grammatical structure in analysis of meaning of statute).
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Reading 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c) on its own may initially seem clear and
unambiguous: “In a prosecution under subsection (a)(1) in which the
defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the person so recruited,
enticed, harbored, transported, provided, obtained or maintained, the
Government need not prove that the defendant knew that the person had not
attained the age of 18 years.”88 From just that subsection, it appears that the
Government must only show that “the defendant had a reasonable
opportunity to observe” the minor to satisfy the mens rea of the age element
of the person recruited.89 However, that reading of subsection (c) may not
be consistent with the statutory scheme of § 1591 as a whole.90 When
reading subsection (a)(1), as referenced in subsection (c), ambiguity is
revealed.
Whoever knowingly—in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce, or within the special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States, recruits, entices, harbors,
transports, provides, obtains, or maintains by any means a
person; . . . knowing, or in reckless disregard of the fact, that
means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion described in
subsection (e)(2), or any combination of such means will be used
to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act, or that the
person has not attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to
engage in a commercial sex act, shall be punished as provided in
subsection (b).91
A plain reading of subsection (a)(1), applying normal grammatical rules,
establishes the mens rea of the age element as knowledge or reckless
disregard.92 In light of subsection (a)(1), subsection (c) could be interpreted
in two different ways.93
88. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c).
89. See id. The next logical question stemming from that reading of the statute asks
what circumstances satisfy “reasonable opportunity to observe.” See supra Part II.B.
90. One judge found that reading to be inconsistent with the mens rea required in §
1591(a). United States v. Wilson, No. 10-60102-CR, 2010 WL 2991561, at *6 (S.D. Fla.
July 27, 2010). Courts interpret statutes consistently with the statutory scheme as a whole.
Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243-45 (1972) (describing the canon of statutory
construction as “in pari materia”).
91. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1).
92. If the inapplicable clauses are ignored, the subsection reads:
[W]hoever knowingly . . . recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides,
obtains, or maintains by any means a person . . . knowing, or in reckless
disregard of the fact, . . . that the person has not attained the age of 18 years and
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First, subsection (c) could stand on its own as providing an additional
mens rea option for the age element by creating a type of strict liability
once the Government has shown the defendant had a reasonable
opportunity to observe the minor. This result is achieved by reading the
subsection as removing the government’s burden of proving the defendant’s
knowledge or reckless disregard of the minor’s age.94
Alternatively, subsection (c) could be read into subsection (a)(1) as a
means of proving reckless disregard.95 Subsection (c) states that “the
Government need not prove that the defendant knew that the person had not
attained the age of 18 years” when the defendant had a reasonable
opportunity to observe the minor.96 This subsection could be interpreted to
allow the government to prove the lesser mens rea of reckless disregard by
demonstrating that the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe
the minor. Obviously, a plain reading of the statute fails to produce clear
results—a failing that is emphasized by the two courts that have addressed
the interpretation of the statute.97
In United States v. Wilson, an unpublished opinion denying a motion to
dismiss the indictment, Judge Rosenbaum of the Southern District of
Florida interpreted the plain language of subsection (c) to require the
government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that “the defendant
recklessly disregarded the person’s age and had a reasonable opportunity to
observe the person.”98 The court ruled that the statute was not ambiguous,
despite the government’s alternative reading of the statute.99 The
government interpreted § 1591(c) to allow strict liability to satisfy the
element of the victim’s status as a minor.100 This ruling was delivered
without significant explanation.101

will be caused to engage in a commercial sexual act, shall be punished as
provided in subsection (b).
Id.
93. Compare United States v. Robinson, 702 F.3d 22, 30-34 (2d Cir. 2012), with
Wilson, 2010 WL 2991561, at *7.
94. See, e.g., Robinson, 702 F.3d at 32.
95. See, e.g., Wilson, 2010 WL 2991561, at *7.
96. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c).
97. See Robinson, 702 F.3d at 30-34; Wilson, 2010 WL 2991561, at *7.
98. 2010 WL 2991561, at *6 (emphasis added).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See id.
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Conversely, the Second Circuit interpreted subsection (c) as creating an
alternative mens rea to satisfy the age element.102 The court interpreted the
statute as granting the government three mens rea options for proving the
age element: (1) by showing the defendant knew the minor’s age, (2) by
showing the defendant recklessly disregarded the minor’s age, or (3) by
showing the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the
minor.103 The court found that “the only interpretation [of § 1591(c)] that
preserves any meaning, is that the provision creates strict liability where the
defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the victim.”104 Notably,
the court was aware of the interpretation by the Wilson court but maintained
that the correct reading of the statute created a form of strict liability.105
As evidenced by conflicting interpretations offered by these two courts, a
plain reading of § 1591 does not provide a clear answer as to the meaning
of its wording. When a plain reading of the statute is insufficient, courts
may turn to legislative history to determine Congress’s intended
meaning.106
2. Legislative History of § 1591
Because courts are directed to give effect to Congress’s intent,107 the
legislative history of a statute may clarify Congress’s intended
interpretation of the statute. The intended interpretation can be deduced
from the congressional record, which includes transcripts of Senate or
House of Representative hearings,108 and previous drafts of bills.109
Legislative history often provides context to the language used in the
statute.110

102. See Robinson, 702 F.3d at 34.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 32.
105. See id. at 30.
106. Flora v. United States, 357 U.S. 63, 65 (1958) (“[A] thorough consideration of the
relevant legislative history is required.”).
107. Id.; see also Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 336 (2000).
108. See, e.g., Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 183 (1978) (utilizing a House of
Representatives Conference Report in exercise of statutory interpretation).
109. See, e.g., Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 854-56 (1984) (considering drafter’s
comments in exercise of statutory interpretation); Hill, 437 U.S. at 183 (utilizing previous
drafts of bills in exercise of statutory interpretation).
110. See Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 110-16
(1980) (analyzing legislative history of a statute in order to determine its meaning).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol65/iss4/4

2013]

COMMENTS

677

Courts begin by looking at the stated purpose of the statute, typically
found in the preamble.111 The purpose of the TVPRA is “to enhance
measures to combat trafficking in persons,”112 and “to ensure just and
effective punishment of traffickers.”113 Devoted to achieving that purpose,
Congress amended § 1591 by adding “reckless disregard” as an alternative
scienter in subsection (a), in addition to adding subsection (c).114 According
to a congressional hearing, “reckless disregard” was deliberately added to
“reach[] those who turn a willfully blind eye toward a person in commercial
sexual activity who is being physically abused or is underage.”115
Congressman Howard Berman also stated that case law inspired the
addition of subsection (c),116 specifically citing United States v. X-Citement
Video, Inc.117 and United States v. Jones.118 In X-Citement Video, the
Supreme Court noted that the common-law presumption of mens rea was
excused in statutes where the “perpetrator confronts the underage victim
personally and may reasonably be required to ascertain that victim’s
age.”119 In Jones, the Fourth Circuit held that the government was not
required to prove that the defendant knew the victim’s minor status in a
prosecution for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), which criminalizes the
transportation of a minor across state lines for sexual purposes.120

111. See, e.g., Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 117 (1990) (relying on the purpose
as stated in the statute in exercise of statutory interpretation); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S.
594, 602 n.7 (1981) (citing the preamble to show congressional awareness of an issue);
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 588-90 (1981) (relying on purposes section of
enacted statute in statutory interpretation).
112. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044, 5044.
113. Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 102(a), 114
Stat. 1464, 1466 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7101(a)). Because the 2008 act reauthorized the
TVPA, and there is no “purpose” section for the 2008 act, the author assumes that the
Reauthorization Act of 2008 was written in light of the stated purpose and findings of the
TVPA.
114. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008,
sec. 222(b)(5), § 1591(a), (c), 122 Stat. at 5069.
115. 154 CONG. REC. H10904 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 2008) (statement of Rep. Howard
Berman).
116. Id.
117. 513 U.S. 64 (1994).
118. 471 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 2006).
119. 513 U.S. at 72 n.2.
120. 471 F.3d at 538-39. The Fourth Circuit’s holding in Jones is consistent with four
other circuits. See United States v. Griffith, 284 F.3d 338, 351 (2d Cir. 2002); United States
v. Taylor, 239 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Scisum, 32 F.3d 1479, 1485-
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Delving into the previous versions of the bill reveals the development of
subsection (c). Congressman Tom Lantos originally sponsored H.R. 3887,
the initial bill seeking to reauthorize the TVPA, in 2007.121 In the proposal,
he included an amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 1591 that replaced the phrase
“that the person has not attained the age of 18 years and . . . will be caused
to engage in a commercial sex act” with “that the person (being a person
who has not attained the age of 18 years) will be caused to engage in a
commercial sex act” will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act.122 In
the same subsection, Congressman Lantos added, “In a prosecution under
this subsection, the Government need not prove that the defendant knew
that the person had not attained the age of 18 years.”123 At that time, the
proposal did not include a requirement that the defendant must have a
reasonable opportunity to observe the minor.124
From this proposal, it appears that Congressman Lantos intended for the
age of the minor merely to be a fact the government had to prove, with no
mens rea required on the part of the defendant.125 This viewpoint was
advocated by Representative Carolyn Maloney during the committee
hearing addressing this bill.126 She urged both the removal of proof of the
defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s status as a minor for conviction
under the then-current version of § 1591 and, alternatively, use of the
victim’s status as a minor to increase punishment in the sentencing phase.127
Relieving the government’s burden of proof as to the defendant’s
knowledge of the victim’s minor status also supported the goal of reducing
reliance on victim testimony, a commonly-expressed objective during the
committee hearing.128
H.R. 3887 died in the Senate in December 2007.129 Congressman Lantos
succumbed to cancer in February 2008,130 and there was no activity to
86 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Hamilton, 456 F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir. 1972) (per
curiam).
121. H.R. REP. NO. 110-430, at 84 (2007).
122. Id. (emphasis omitted).
123. Id.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. Combating Modern Slavery: Reauthorization of Anti-Trafficking Programs:
Hearing on H.R. 3887 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 66, at 30 (statement
of Rep. Carolyn B. Maloney).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 95 (statement of Amy Farrell, Inst. on Race & Justice, Ne. Univ.).
129. Bill Summary & Status: H.R. 3887, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/
home/LegislativeData.php (select “110” under “Select Congress”; then select
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reauthorize the TVPA until December 2008.131 Congressman Berman
proposed H.R. 7311, containing the amendment that reflects the current
state of § 1591.132 Before the House of Representatives, Congressman
Berman explained that H.R. 7311 drew from H.R. 3887, but “develop[ed]
alternative proposals where the two bills diverge.”133 Congressman Berman
also stated that the intentions behind the provisions were “closely
aligned.”134 However, the resulting additions in H.R. 7311 of both the
“reckless disregard” mens rea and subsection (c) reflected a significant
divergence in congressional thought on mens rea.135 After receiving
approval by unanimous consent in both the House of Representatives and
the Senate without amendment, President George W. Bush signed H.R.
7311 into law on December 23, 2008.136
The sponsors of H.R. 7311, obviously dissatisfied with the strict liability
standard asserted in H.R. 3887, failed to indicate the source of the
disagreement in the Congressional Record. Nevertheless, lobbyist materials
may explain the shift in thought.137 Nine days after the hearing on H.R.
3887 in 2007, the Department of Justice (DOJ) expressed its concerns about
the bill to Committee on the Judiciary Chair Representative John Conyers,
Jr.138 Specifically, the DOJ was concerned with the creation of a strict
liability crime by removal of the mens rea requirement for the minor’s
status.139 While similarities were drawn to 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), a strict
“Word/Phrase” under “Enter Search”; then select “Include Variants (plurals, etc.)”; then
search “3887”; then select “H.R. 3887”; then select “All Information”) (last visited June 5,
2013).
130. David M. Herszenhorn, Tom Lantos, 80, Is Dead; Longtime Congressman, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 12, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/12/washington/12lantos.html.
131. Bill Summary & Status: H.R. 7311, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/
home/LegislativeData.php (select “110” under “Select Congress”; then select “Berman,
Howard L. [D-CA-28]” under “Choose House Members”; then select “Word/Phrase” under
“Enter Search” and search “wilberforce”; then select “H.R. 7311”; then select “All
Information”).
132. Id.
133. 154 CONG. REC. H10903 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 2008) (statement of Rep. Howard
Berman).
134. Id.
135. Bill Summary & Status: H.R. 7311, supra note 131.
136. Id.
137. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 84, at 131.
138. See Letter from Brian A. Benczkowski, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen.,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to John Conyers, Jr., Chairman, House Comm. on the Judiciary (Nov.
9, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/olp/pdf/dept-view-letter-hjc-on-hr3887.pdf.
139. Id. at 8.
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liability crime for aggravated sexual abuse, the DOJ pointed to the
affirmative defense available under § 2423.140 As written, H.R. 3887
created “a substantial mandatory minimum sentence for a[] . . . strict
liability crime.”141 The DOJ argued that the amendment to § 1591(a) “[ran]
counter to the criminal law goal of punishing culpable states of mind.”142 In
a separate publication, the DOJ suggested that an affirmative defense might
alleviate some of its concerns.143
While legislative history is commonly consulted in determining a
statute’s meaning, some scholars suggest that current trends indicate the
Supreme Court is reluctant to rely on statements made during a statute’s
enactment.144 The Court may decline to find a statement made during the
legislative process to be “an authoritative interpretation” of a statute.145
Legislative history is often criticized because it is comprised of statements
made by individuals when the goal of statutory interpretation is to
determine the collective intent of Congress.146 Some scholars have even
suggested that statements might be purposefully made to influence an
interpretation of the statute that could not be achieved through the
legislative process.147 As a result, the pursuit of a statute’s meaning rarely
concludes with an analysis of the legislative history.148 However, legislative
history remains a useful tool to understand the development of the language
used in a particular statute.149

140. Id. at 9; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), (g) (2012) (permitting a reasonable mistakeof-age defense).
141. Letter from Brian A. Benczkowski to John Conyers, Jr., supra note 138, at 8.
142. Id.
143. Facts about the Department of Justice’s Anti-Trafficking Efforts: July 2008, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/olp/pdf/myths-and-facts.pdf (last visited June 6,
2013).
144. CHRISTIAN E. MAMMEN, USING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN AMERICAN STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 27 (2002); see also BROWN & BROWN, supra note 84, at 117 (discussing
critiques of relying on legislative history for statutory interpretation).
145. NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571, 582 (1994).
146. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 84, at 124; see, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50 (1911); United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S.
290, 318 (1897) (collecting cases).
147. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 84, at 117.
148. Id. at 5 (“A number of judicial opinions use a combination of interpretative
methods.”).
149. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23-24 (1983) (discussing the evolution
of a statute in determining congressional intent).
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3. Common Statutory Scheme—Similar Statutes
Whenever possible, statutes should be interpreted to be consistent with
existing statutes on the same subject matter.150 This canon of statutory
construction proves especially true for statutes amended or drafted by the
same session in Congress.151 Five federal statutes address criminal activity
similar to that targeted in § 1591.152
Title 18 U.S.C. § 2241 criminalizes aggravated sexual abuse, defining
the offense as “knowingly caus[ing] another person to engage in a sexual
act” through the use of force or threatening death, serious bodily injury or
kidnapping.153 Section 2241(c) prescribes the increase in the mandatory
minimum sentence based on the victim’s minority status.154 Using language
similar to § 1591, the statute punishes more severely those who knowingly
engage in the prohibited conduct in subsections (a) and (b) with “a person
who has not attained the age of 12 years.”155 Notably, § 2241(d),
substantially similar to § 1591(c), provides that “in a prosecution under
subsection (c) of this section, the Government need not prove that the
defendant knew that the other person engaging in the sexual act had not
attained the age of 12 years.”156 Reading the plain language of § 2241
indicates that the government must only prove the victim was less than
twelve years old without the necessity of demonstrating that the defendant
knew the victim’s age.157 Therefore, § 2241 essentially creates a strict
liability crime if the victim is less than twelve years old.
Section 2241 does not contain a provision allowing the alternative of
proving the defendant acted with reckless disregard in committing the
sexual act, as permitted in § 1591.158 Nevertheless, because the language in
§ 1591(c) tracks so closely with § 2241(d), it may be assumed that
Congress had a similar intent in mind—to create a strict liability crime as it

150. Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243-45 (1972) (describing the canon of
statutory construction as “in pari materia”).
151. Id. at 244.
152. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2251-2252, 2422-2423 (2012).
153. Id. § 2241(a).
154. Id. § 2241(c).
155. Compare id., with 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2012).
156. 18 U.S.C. § 2241(d).
157. See id.; see also United States v. Brown, 330 F.3d 1073, 1077 (8th Cir. 2003)
(including jury instructions requiring the government to prove that the minor had not
attained the age of twelve years at the time of the offense without an element requiring the
defendant’s awareness of the victim’s age).
158. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2241, with 18 U.S.C. § 1591.
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relates to the commercial sexual exploitation of minors.159 In fact, Congress
cited this statute directly when stating the reasoning behind drafting §
1591.160
The federal statute criminalizing the production of child pornography, 18
U.S.C. § 2251, also creates strict liability regarding the element of the age
of the victim.161 The Supreme Court noted that strict liability was
appropriate, as the producers of child pornography “confront[] the underage
victim personally and may reasonably be required to ascertain that victim’s
age.”162 The perpetrator carries the “risk of error” of misidentifying the
victim’s age.163
Perpetrators charged with an offense prohibited by § 1591 typically
interact with the victim personally and, therefore, like under § 2251, can be
reasonably required to determine the victim’s age.164 Because the
underlying conduct of pandering is illegal,165 it may be even more
appropriate that the sex trafficker carries the “risk of error,” similar to the
child pornographer who misidentifies his victim’s age.166
But the Supreme Court refused to apply strict liability to the mens rea of
the victim’s minority status in prosecuting the transportation of child
pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252.167 After carefully analyzing the
statutory language and the congressional history, the Court ruled that
making § 2252 a strict liability crime would raise constitutional issues,
specifically with the First Amendment.168 The mens rea in § 2252
distinguished “legal innocence from wrongful conduct.”169
However, the same constitutional issues do not arise with § 1591.
Imposing strict liability for the mens rea for the age of the minor does not

159. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c), with 18 U.S.C. § 2241(d).
160. 154 CONG. REC. H10904 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 2008) (statement of Rep. Howard
Berman).
161. 18 U.S.C. § 2251; United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 76 n.5
(1994).
162. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. at 72 n.2.
163. Id. at 76 n.5.
164. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). Persons involved with sex trafficking but who do not
confront the victim personally are charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b).
165. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 11-303 (West 2011).
166. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. at 76 n.5 (noting that producers of child
pornography interact with victims and, therefore, can bear the “risk of error” in determining
the performer’s age).
167. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2252.
168. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. at 78.
169. Id. at 73.
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create the criminal conduct. The underlying conduct by the perpetrator—
causing a person to engage in a commercial sex act—would still be illegal,
regardless of the victim’s age.170
Coercing or enticing a minor to engage in prostitution or any sexual
activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense is
prohibited in 18 U.S.C. § 2422.171 Like 18 U.S.C. § 1591, it prohibits such
conduct against an “individual who has not attained the age of 18 years.”172
While the Supreme Court has not interpreted this statute, the Seventh
Circuit applied the ruling from United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc. to
hold, in United States v. Coté, that in a prosecution under this statute the
government must prove that the defendant knew the victim was under the
age of eighteen years.173 The court avoided the potential constitutional
issues discussed in X-Citement Video, where a scienter requirement
distinguished legal conduct from wrongful conduct, by imposing a mens rea
requirement on the age of the victim to avoid criminalizing legal conduct.174
However, the requirement of mens rea of the victim’s age in § 1591 would
not be necessary to distinguish legal conduct from wrongful conduct.
Perhaps the most similar statute to § 1591 is 18 U.S.C. § 2423, which
criminalizes the transportation of minors across state lines or in foreign
commerce for the purpose of engaging in criminal sexual activity or illicit
sexual conduct.175 Six circuit courts have addressed the interpretation of the
mens rea of the age of the minor in this statute; all held that the government
does not have to prove that the defendant knew that the victim was under
the age of eighteen years.176

170. If the perpetrator utilized force, fraud, or coercion to cause the victim to engage in a
commercial sex act, and the jurisdictional requirements are satisfied, the perpetrator can be
prosecuted under § 1591(a). Most states also criminalize causing a person to engage in a
commercial sex act. See Comprehensive State Human Trafficking Statutes, POLARIS PROJECT
(July 2011), https://na4.salesforce.com/sfc/p/300000006E4SgF3edAeOtn_qXq9oDm1oHDo
YM6c.
171. 18 U.S.C. § 2422.
172. Id. § 2422(b).
173. United States v. Coté, 504 F.3d 682, 685-86 (7th Cir. 2007).
174. See id. at 686.
175. See 18 U.S.C. § 2423.
176. United States v. Daniels, 653 F.3d 399, 410 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Cox,
577 F.3d 833, 836-37 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Jones, 471 F.3d 535, 538-39 (4th Cir.
2006); United States v. Griffith, 284 F.3d 338, 350-51 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v.
Taylor, 239 F.3d 994, 996 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Hamilton, 456 F.2d 171, 173 (3d
Cir. 1972).
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These rulings are diametrically opposed to the holding in FloresFigueroa v. United States.177 Addressing the interpretation of a statute
criminalizing aggravated identity theft, the Supreme Court held in FloresFigueroa that the word “knowingly” applied to each element of the
statute.178 The Sixth and Seventh Circuits, addressing the interpretation of §
2423 post-Flores-Figueroa, distinguished the case by focusing on the
holding in X-Citement Video, on which the Court had relied in FloresFigueroa.179
In X-Citement Video, the Supreme Court also held that the word
“knowingly” applied to the age of the minor in the context of child
pornography.180 However, the Supreme Court specifically noted, on more
than one occasion in X-Citement Video, that the mens rea was necessary to
distinguish legal conduct from wrongful conduct.181 The Sixth and Seventh
Circuits distinguished Flores-Figueroa on that basis and held that § 2423
merely increased the punishment based on the victim’s minor status for
already wrongful conduct.182 The transportation of persons across state lines
for the purpose of engaging in prostitution is prohibited in § 2421, which
mirrors § 2423, but for the victim’s age language.183 In light of Congress’s
intent to provide minors with “special protection against sexual
exploitation,” the Seventh Circuit noted that it would be “implausible that
Congress would want it to be harder to prove a violation of § 2423(a) than
of § 2421.”184
Justice Alito, concurring in Flores-Figueroa, emphasized that statutory
interpretation should also consider context and that the majority’s holding
should not be a rigid rule.185 He specifically referenced § 2423 as an

177. See 556 U.S. 646, 652 (2009).
178. Id. at 652-55.
179. Id. at 652; Daniels, 653 F.3d at 410 (citing the discussion of United States v. XCitement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994), in Cox, 577 F.3d at 837); Cox, 577 F.3d at 837.
180. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. at 75.
181. Id. at 72 n.5, 73 & n.3.
182. Daniels, 653 F.3d at 410 (citing the discussion of X-Citement Video, Inc., in Cox,
577 F.3d at 837); Cox, 577 F.3d at 837.
183. See Cox, 577 F.3d at 837. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (2012), with 18 U.S.C. §
2423.
184. Cox, 577 F.3d at 837 (citing United States v. Taylor, 239 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir.
2001)).
185. Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 659-61 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).
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example where the context may implicate that “knowingly” does not apply
to all elements of the offense.186
In addition, Congress provided a safeguard in § 2423 to avoid any
potential constitutional issues. Subsection (g) provides an affirmative
defense for a defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he
reasonably believed that the person was over the age of eighteen years.187
However, this defense is not available for prosecutions under § 2423(a),
which criminalizes transportation of any person with intent to engage in
criminal sexual activity.188 This harkens back to the Supreme Court’s
statement in X-Citement Video—that strict liability as it pertains to age is
permissible in cases where the underlying conduct itself is illegal,
regardless of the victim’s minority status.
Congress passively approved this interpretation of § 2423.189 United
States v. Jones was cited by Congress in the passage of § 1591, imposing
strict liability on the defendant for the victim’s age.190 Jones held that the
minor’s age was “a fact which the prosecution must prove and for which
the defendant is responsible.”191 That holding is consistent with the four
other circuit courts that have ruled on the issue.192 The Jones court noted
that Congress amended § 2423 on nine different occasions since the circuit
courts’ adoption of the strict liability interpretation yet never amended the
statute to require the government to prove the defendant’s knowledge of the
victim’s minor status.193
Sections 1591 and 2423 share special connections both in legislative
history and in prosecution. Section 2423, originally enacted in 1978,194 has
become the statute used to punish those participating in child sex

186. Id.
187. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(g).
188. Id. § 2423(a).
189. See 154 CONG. REC. H10904 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 2008) (statement of Rep. Howard
Berman).
190. Id.; see also United States v. Jones, 471 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 2006).
191. Jones, 471 F.3d at 538.
192. Id. at 538-39 (citing United States v. Griffith, 284 F.3d 338, 351 (2d Cir. 2002);
United States v. Taylor, 239 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Scisum, 32 F.3d
1479, 1485-86 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Hamilton, 456 F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir.
1972)).
193. Id. at 539.
194. Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95225, sec. 3(a), § 2423, 92 Stat. 7, 8 (1978).
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tourism.195 Child sex tourism occurs when a person travels with the intent to
engage in any illicit sexual activity with a child in another country.196 Sex
trafficking of minors and child sex tourism are two closely related crimes,
which have been addressed by Congress in conjunction with each other.197
In its efforts to prosecute sex traffickers, the DOJ utilizes § 2423 in addition
to § 1591.198 Accordingly, § 2423 remains the most closely-related statute
to § 1591, both in intent and construction.199 For these reasons, the
construction and application of § 2423 should inform the interpretation of §
1591.
A review of the statutory background against which Congress legislated
demonstrates Congress’s intent to protect children from sexual exploitation
through the specific designs of these statutes.200 Still, that goal must be
balanced by avoiding the criminalization of legal conduct.201 In light of the
statutory context, Congress most likely drafted § 1591(c) to allow for strict
liability as it applies to the victim’s minority status in an effort to ease the
burden on prosecuting sex traffickers. Causing a person to engage in a
commercial sex act is already criminal conduct; the minority status simply
increases the punishment.202 However, courts are tasked with interpreting
195. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today
Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, sec. 105, § 2423(b)-(g), 117 Stat. 650, 653-54 (amending
18 U.S.C. § 2423 to include punishment for those participating in child sex tourism).
196. See 18 U.S.C. § 2423 (2012).
197. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248,
sec. 204, 208, §§ 2423(a), 1591(b), 120 Stat. 587, 613, 615.
198. See Human Trafficking Prosecution Unit, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice
.gov/crt/about/crm/htpu.php#tra (last visited June 9, 2013).
199. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, sec. 204, 208, §§
2423(a), 1591(b), 120 Stat. at 613, 615.
200. United States v. Taylor, 239 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing H.R. Rep. No.
105-557, at 17 (1998), reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 678, 686).
201. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 73 (1994).
202. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1) (2012), with id. § 2422. All states and the District
of Columbia have anti-pimping laws. ALA. CODE § 13A-12-111 (1977); ALASKA STAT. §
11.66.110 (2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3209 (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-70-101
(1975); CAL. PENAL CODE § 266i (West 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-203 (2011); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 53a-85 (2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1352 (1953); D.C. Code § 22-2705
(2013); FLA. STAT. § 796.05 (1943); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-11 (2006); HAW. REV. STAT. §
712-1202 (2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-5606 (1994); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-14.3
(2011); IND. CODE § 35-45-4-4 (1976); IOWA CODE § 725.3 (2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 216420 (2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 529.040 (West 2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:83.1
(1984); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A § 853 (1975); MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW § 11-304 (2013);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 7 (2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.455 (1948); MINN. STAT. §
609.322 (2012); MISS. CODE ANN. §97-29-51 (2013); MO. REV. STAT. § 567.050 (1977);
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the statute as written and should not judicially amend the statute in an effort
to align the statute more clearly with congressional intent.203
4. Avoiding Constitutional Issues
In deference to Congress and the presumption that Congress legislates
within the bounds of the Constitution, courts interpret statutes to avoid
constitutional issues.204 Interpreting § 1591(c) to create strict liability as to
the age of the victim may violate the constitutional prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment found in the Eighth Amendment.205 Such an
argument has already been advanced, although it was not considered due to
ripeness concerns.206 A person convicted under § 1591(a)(1) faces a
minimum sentence of ten years imprisonment to a maximum sentence of
life in prison.207 If the minor involved was under the age of fourteen years,
the defendant faces imprisonment for a minimum of fifteen years to a
maximum sentence of life.208
These mandatory minimum sentences were established in 2006.209
Before 2006, a conviction under § 1591(a)(1) did not have a mandatory

MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-602 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-802 (2013); NEV. REV. STAT. §
201.300 (1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645:2 (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1 (West
2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-4 (1981); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.32 (McKinney 2013);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-204 (1919); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-29-01 (2013); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2907.22 (LexisNexis 2011); 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1081 (2002); OR. REV. STAT. §
167.012 (2011); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5902 (2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-34.1-7 (2009); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-15-100 (1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-23-2 (2005); TENN. CODE ANN. §
39-13-515 (2011); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.03 (West 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-101305 (LexisNexis 2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2637 (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-357
(1980); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.88.070 (2012); W. VA. CODE § 61-8-5 (2010); WIS. STAT. §
944.33 (2001); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-4-103 (2013).
203. United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 68-69 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment) (“It is beyond our province to rescue Congress from its drafting errors, and to
provide for what we might think, perhaps along with some Members of Congress, is the
preferred result.”).
204. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568,
575 (1988) (collecting cases).
205. United States v. Wilson, No. 10-60102-CR, 2010 WL 2991561, at *10-11 (S.D. Fla.
July 27, 2010).
206. Id. (declining to address the Eighth Amendment issue because the defendant had not
been sentenced and, thus, the issue was not ripe for review).
207. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(2).
208. Id. § 1591(b)(1).
209. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248,
sec. 208, § 1591(b), 120 Stat. 587, 615.
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minimum sentence.210 If the victim was between the ages of fourteen years
and eighteen years, the maximum sentence was forty years
imprisonment.211 Without specifically raising a potential constitutionality
issue, the DOJ expressed concerns regarding the “substantial mandatory
minimum sentence for an already unusual strict liability crime.”212
While it may seem that the penalties are harsh for a strict liability crime,
especially the mandatory minimum sentences, it is unlikely that a court will
rule the statute unconstitutional based on cruel and unusual punishment
grounds.213 To be unconstitutional on these grounds, the punishment must
be “grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime.”214 In light of
courts’ deference to Congress in setting punishment terms, courts rarely
find a non-capital sentence grossly disproportionate to the related
offense.215 The likelihood that a ten- or fifteen-year mandatory minimum
sentence will be determined to be cruel and unusual is unlikely, even if the
sentence is imposed under a strict liability standard.216
The constitutionality of the sentencing provisions in § 1591 still has not
been challenged.217 But a sentence of thirty years for aggravated sexual
abuse of a minor, under 18 U.S.C. § 2241, survived a constitutional
challenge for cruel and unusual punishment despite the strict liability
standard for the victim’s minor status.218 The Supreme Court has hinted that
a life without the possibility of parole sentence might fall to an Eighth

210. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(1) (Supp. IIII 2003) (amended 2006).
211. Id. § 1591(b)(2).
212. Letter from Brian A. Benczkowski to John Conyers, Jr., supra note 138, at 8.
213. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980) (“Outside the context of capital
punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been
exceedingly rare.”).
214. Id. at 271.
215. United States v. Farley, 607 F.3d 1294, 1343 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 998-99 (1991)). The Supreme Court upheld a mandatory life
sentence for obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses, imposed based on a recidivist statute.
Rummel, 445 U.S. at 266, 285. Contra Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 281, 283-84, 303
(1983) (affirming the Eighth Circuit’s decision overturning a sentence of life imprisonment
without parole for a check fraud offense, and distinguishing Rummel on the fact that the
sentence in Rummel had the possibility of parole).
216. See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272.
217. Except, of course, in United States v. Wilson. No. 10-60102-CR, 2010 WL 2991561,
at *10-11 (S.D. Fla. July 27, 2010). In that opinion, addressing several pre-trial motions, the
court declined to address the cruel and unusual punishment challenge, stating that the
defendant lacked standing as he had not been convicted and sentenced. Id.
218. Farley, 607 F.3d at 1342.
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Amendment challenge.219 Because § 1591 does not allow for that penalty,
and due to the deference shown to the legislature in determining minimum
and maximum prison terms, a constitutional challenge rooted in the Eighth
Amendment would likely fail to prevent a court from applying strict
liability to the minor’s age in a prosecution under § 1591.
B. The Role of “Reasonable Opportunity to Observe”
Regardless of which alternative interpretation of § 1591(c) the court
adopts, it must also define “reasonable opportunity to observe.”220 A
number of questions must be answered, including what circumstances
establish a “reasonable opportunity to observe.” The court must also
consider whether to instruct the jury to focus on either the reasonableness of
the opportunity to observe the minor or the reasonableness of the
conclusions drawn from the opportunity to observe the minor.
Addressing each in turn, no definitive answers exist. Neither case law
nor legislative history provides any concrete guidance as to the appropriate
definition of “reasonable opportunity to observe.” A common theme
emerges, however, based on duration of the observation and the context of
the observation.
While no court has defined “reasonable opportunity to observe,” two
cases may shed light on what satisfies a “reasonable opportunity to
observe.”221 In the only published opinion applying § 1591(c), the jury in
United States v. Robinson found by special verdict that the defendant had a
reasonable opportunity to observe the victim and, therefore, to determine
her status as a minor.222 In that case, the defendant recruited a seventeenyear-old victim to engage in prostitution.223 The victim testified that the
defendant was her “boyfriend” and “lover” whom she had dated for two-

219. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023, 2034 (2010) (“The Constitution
prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not
commit homicide.”).
220. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c) (2012).
221. See United States v. Robinson, 702 F.3d 22, 27-29 (2d Cir. 2012); United States v.
Paris, No. 03:06-CR-64(CFD), 2007 WL 3124724, at *9 (D. Conn. Oct. 24, 2007).
222. Robinson, 702 F.3d at 29; see also Special Verdict Form, Robinson, No. 09-CR-794
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2010). Because the opinion in Wilson was a ruling on a pre-trial motion
for summary judgment, the court did not apply § 1591(c) to the facts of the case. See Wilson,
2010 WL 2991561.
223. Robinson, 702 F.3d at 27-29; Brief for United States at 15-17, Robinson, 702 F.3d
22 (No. 11-0301), 2011 WL 3437848, at *26-28.
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and-a-half years.224 The jury found these facts sufficient to satisfy
“reasonable opportunity to observe.”225
In a case charged under the 2000 version of § 1591,226 the jury found that
the defendant consciously avoided knowing the victim’s age based on
evidence that the defendant had seen the minor’s naked body when she was
fourteen years of age, had sex with her at that age, and knew that she had
“young friends who were still in high school.”227 The defendant caused the
victim to engage in commercial sex acts for approximately one-and-a-half
years.228 In both this case and Robinson, the defendants had opportunities to
observe the minors for at least one year and had sexual relations with the
minors.229
Significantly shorter durations of observation have likewise been found
to establish “reasonable opportunit[ies] to observe,” albeit in different
contexts.230 During a bank robbery, twenty minutes sufficed for a witness to
have a “reasonable opportunity to observe” the defendant for identification
purposes, despite the witness’s distress at the time of observation.231 In
another case, the defendant kidnapped a young girl and her brother when
they were walking home from school with friends.232 After raping the girl
twice, the defendant left the girl and her brother in a field where they were
rescued by the police later that day.233 The police apprehended the
defendant the following day and he was identified by the girl and her
brother, as well as by friends who were present when the abduction

224. Transcript of Trial, United States v. Robinson, No. 09-CR-794 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 26,
2010).
225. Robinson, 702 F.3d at 29.
226. 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2000) (amended 2008) (requiring proof that the defendant knew
the victim’s age).
227. United States v. Paris, No. 3:06-CR-64(CFD), 2007 WL 3124724, at *9 (D. Conn.
Oct. 24, 2007) (discussing the charges resulting from victim Marianne C.).
228. Id. at *2.
229. Robinson, 2012 WL 5971545, at *8-9; Paris, 2007 WL 3124724, at *2.
230. E.g., United States v. Holiday, 457 F.2d 912, 915 (3d Cir. 1972) (discussing “ample
opportunity” to observe the defendant during bank robbery); United States v. Hinkle, 448
F.2d 1157, 1158 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (observing the defendant for three to four minutes in good
lighting at less than eight feet away sufficed for identification purposes).
231. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 410, 414 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982).
232. Reynold v. Lockhart, 470 F.2d 161, 162 (8th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
233. Id.
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occurred.234 The Eighth Circuit noted that “the nature of the crime itself”
allowed the victims the opportunity to observe the defendant.235
The common theme of confronting the person in close proximity for
some period of time emerges. This is consistent with the Supreme Court’s
statements, in dicta, that a producer of child pornography “confronts the
underage victim personally and may reasonably be required to ascertain that
victim’s age.”236 Therefore, “reasonable opportunity to observe” may
simply require confronting the victim personally for some reasonable
amount of time. When a defendant has observed a victim over a significant
period of time and had sexual relations with her, it may be easier to
establish that the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe.237
However, where the minor victim is close to the age of eighteen years and
possibly more physically developed, it may become more challenging to
satisfy “reasonable opportunity to observe.” The definition of “reasonable”
becomes pertinent.
In difficult cases, determining whether the defendant had a reasonable
opportunity to observe the minor may turn on whether the focus is on the
reasonableness of the opportunity or the reasonableness of the conclusions
drawn from the observation of the minor.238 For example, the defendant
may have a reasonable opportunity to observe the victim at length, but his
observations may reasonably lead him to believe that the victim is at least
eighteen years of age. Observing the victim purchase cigarettes or alcohol
or the victim’s physical appearance may lead the reasonable person to
conclude that the victim is over the age of eighteen years.
Denial of the admission of this type of evidence (demonstrating that lay
witnesses reasonably concluded the victim was at least the age of consent)
was held to be reversible error in a conviction of sexual abuse of a minor.239
234. Id.
235. Id.; see also United States ex rel. Oliver v. Pennsylvania, 321 F. Supp. 192, 194
(E.D. Pa. 1970) (stating that a rape victim “had sufficient opportunity to observe each of
them” after observing the defendants for two hours).
236. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 n.2 (1994); see also 154
CONG. REC. H10904 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 2008) (statement of Rep. Howard Berman) (citing
X-Citement Video, Inc., as motivating the addition of subsection (c) to 18 U.S.C. § 1591).
237. Domestic Sex Trafficking: Criminal Operations of the American Pimp, supra note
67. Because many sex traffickers groom their victims by raping them, this fact pattern may
be common. Id.
238. Without statutory or judicial guidance, the jury will have to determine whether the
length of time was reasonable to determine the age of the victim or, alternatively, whether
the observations would reasonably lead the defendant to believe the victim was a minor.
239. United States v. Yazzie, 976 F.2d 1252, 1253 (9th Cir. 1992).
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The court stated that the lay witnesses’ conclusions that the victim was at
least the age of consent based on observations of the victim smoking, of the
victim driving a vehicle, and of the victim’s physical appearance would
have been helpful to the jury in understanding a fact at issue, namely the
defendant’s reasonable-mistake-of-age defense.240 In that case, the mere
opportunity to observe may not have put the defendant on sufficient notice
that the person was less than eighteen years of age. Establishing
“reasonable opportunity to observe” may depend on demonstrating that the
defendant observed indicators that reasonably led him to believe the victim
was a minor.
Ultimately, the definition of “reasonable opportunity to observe” may
simply be a question left for the jury to decide based on the judge’s
instructions.241 Jurors may draw inferences as to whether the defendant had
the opportunity to reasonably observe the minor based on their own
observations of the minor during trial or through other evidence, such as
photographs of the minor from the time period when first recruited.242
III. Repercussions Resulting from the Ambiguity of 18 U.S.C. § 1591
Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1591, among other statutes, to empower
federal prosecutors and agencies to effectively punish sex traffickers.243
However, empirical and anecdotal evidence demonstrates prosecutors may
elect to prosecute sex traffickers under different laws.244 For example, a
representative of the Human Trafficking Task Force in Washington, D.C.,
testified that the majority of the prosecutions the task force has conducted
have been under local or state laws because prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. §

240. Id. at 1254-56.
241. See, e.g., United States v. Del Toro, 426 F.2d 181, 184 (5th Cir. 1970) (“It is the
function of the jury to determine the facts and thereby the guilt or innocence of the
defendant.”); Transcript of Trial at 350, United States v. Robinson, No. 09-CR-794
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2010).
242. See, e.g., United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that in a
case alleging the receipt and possession of child pornography, jurors can rely on common
sense to determine whether children in photographs were real as opposed to virtual).
243. Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 102, 114 Stat.
1464, 1466.
244. Peters, supra note 61, at 87; Smith & Vardaman, supra note 63, at 278; e.g., Brooke
Grona-Robb, Prosecuting Human Traffickers, TEX. DIST. & CNTY. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, http://
www.tdcaa.com/node/7370 (last visited June 9, 2013).
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1591 are too resource-intensive and run a higher risk of re-traumatizing the
victim when compared to prosecutions under local laws.245
Prosecuting under state laws will hinder the other TVPA goals of
prevention and protection. Not only is sex trafficking a nationwide
problem,246 states often lack the necessary resources to effectively prosecute
sex trafficking enterprises that can span states and nations.247 Victims may
lose access to federally funded victim services if their cases are not tried
under a federal trafficking statute.248 Prevention efforts are not met because
local statutes often have significantly lighter prison sentences.249 In
addition, the effectiveness of the federal statute can impact state
prosecutions as states often model their prosecutions of sex trafficking
crimes after federal programs. Without effective federal prosecution under
§ 1591, Congress’s goal of eradicating the second-largest criminal industry
in the world will not be realized.250
A. Consequences of Ineffective Prosecution on the Goal of Protecting Sex
Trafficking Victims
Prosecuting under state laws often results in inadequate protection for the
victim. Since its inception, the TVPA has provided coordinated social
services to victims, as well as immigration services, if needed, that cannot
be duplicated by the states.251 In order to access these services and
protections, victims must be recognized as sex trafficking victims.252
245. Combating Modern Slavery: Reauthorization of Anti-Trafficking Programs:
Hearing on H.R. 3887 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 66, at 43 (statement
of Bradley W. Myles, Nat’l Program Director, Polaris Project).
246. See, e.g., Annual Report—2010: National Human Trafficking Resource Center
(NHTRC), POLARIS PROJECT 19 (2011), available at https://na4.salesforce.com/sfc/p/
300000006E4Si WNbb7yid8slHcffD3847fcBJts= (detailing hotline calls from victims from
states across the nation).
247. Accord 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(24) (2012) (describing the need for federal legislation
to attack the problem of human trafficking from the states to worldwide).
248. Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464; 18
U.S.C. § 1593 (2012); see also Smith & Vardaman, supra note 63, at 278-79 (discussing the
ramifications of charging sex traffickers under non-trafficking statutes).
249. The local D.C. statute has a statutory maximum of twenty years for pandering of a
minor, with no mandatory minimum, which is significantly less than the mandatory
minimum of ten or fifteen years, depending on the age of the minor, to a maximum of life
imprisonment under the federal statute. Compare D.C. CODE § 22-2705(c)(2) (2010), with 18
U.S.C. § 1591(b)(1)-(2).
250. Sex Trafficking, supra note 8.
251. See Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, § 107, 114 Stat. at 1474-80.
252. 22 U.S.C. § 7105(b).
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Oftentimes, victims of trafficking are identified only after being arrested
for prostitution.253 Child victims of sex trafficking may spend a significant
amount of time in juvenile detention before being identified as trafficking
victims.254 Once released from detention, these victims need food, shelter,
psychological care, and legal services.255 Child victims are often placed in
foster care, but they need special attention, including health care and
counseling.256 Depending on how long individuals are held by their
traffickers, they may also need educational or vocational training.257
Without these services, the victims may be more vulnerable to being retrafficked.258 Through the TVPA, a trafficking victim may be eligible for
these types of services.259
In order for an immigrant child to receive social services, a requestor,
typically an investigator, must submit a form to the Office of Refugee
Resettlement.260 This requires, first, that the investigator recognize the child
as a victim of trafficking and, second, that the investigator be aware of the
social services available through the United States Department of Health
and Human Services as provided by the TVPA.261
In addition, prosecution and conviction under the federal sex trafficking
statute result in mandatory restitution to be paid to the victim or her
guardian.262 If necessary, an identified victim of sex trafficking may be

253. Linda A. Smith et al., The National Report on Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking:
America’s Prostituted Children, SHARED HOPE INT’L 52 (2009), available at http://shared
hope.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/SHI_National_Report_on_DMST_2009.pdf.
254. Id. at 54.
255. See Fact Sheet: Child Victims of Human Trafficking, supra note 41.
256. Id.
257. See Job Training, POLARIS PROJECT, http://www.polarisproject.org/what-wedo/client-services/our-services/job-training-program (last visited June 10, 2013) (describing
job training programs available for human trafficking victims).
258. See Combating Modern Slavery: Reauthorization of Anti-Trafficking Programs:
Hearing on H.R. 3887 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 66, at 76 (statement
of Dorchen A. Leidholt, Director, Sanctuary for Families’ Ctr. for Battered Women’s Legal
Servs.).
259. 22 U.S.C. § 7105 (2012). In order to be eligible for these benefits, the Secretary of
Health and Human Services must certify that the victim meets certain requirements,
including that she assists in the investigation. Id. § 7105(b)(1)(E).
260. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Request for Assistance for Child Victims of
Human Trafficking (OMB No. 0970-0362, n.d.), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/
sites/default/files/orr/request_for_assistance_for_child_victims_of_human_trafficking.pdf.
261. Id. (instructing investigators regarding law enforcement providing assistance).
262. 18 U.S.C. § 1593.
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eligible for federal witness protection.263 Without prosecution under 18
U.S.C. § 1591, the victim may not be eligible for these benefits.264
While prosecution itself is not necessary for a victim to be eligible for
social services under the TVPA, official acknowledgement of her as a
trafficking victim is required.265 Because acknowledgement as a trafficking
victim first requires that the law enforcement agent or prosecutor recognize
the victim as such, awareness of the crime of sex trafficking and how to
identify sex trafficking victims is necessary.266 This awareness comes from
proper training and the application of that training to effective
prosecutions.267 Without training and prosecution experience, victims will
not be recognized as trafficking victims because investigators and
prosecutors will fail to identify the signs that a child has been trafficked
into the commercial sex industry.268 Furthermore, if the child is not
recognized as a trafficking victim, she may face prosecution for
prostitution269 and may be more likely to be re-trafficked without the
resources to keep her safe.270

263. Id. § 1594.
264. See 22 U.S.C. § 7105(b). While prosecution is not required, prosecution under 18
U.S.C. § 1591 means the prosecutor identified the victim as a sex trafficking victim, which
will make her eligible for these services. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591. Furthermore, if the person is
identified as a victim of another type of crime (for example, pandering), she may not be
eligible for these services limited to sex trafficking victims. See 22 U.S.C. § 7105(b).
265. See 22 U.S.C. § 7105(b).
266. See HEATHER J. CLAWSON ET AL., ICF INT’L, PROSECUTING HUMAN TRAFFICKING
CASES: LESSONS LEARNED AND PROMISING PRACTICES 24 (Jun. 30, 2008), available at
https:// www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/223972.pdf.
267. See id.
268. See id.
269. See, e.g., Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 43.02 (West 2011).
270. See Combating Modern Slavery: Reauthorization of Anti-Trafficking Programs:
Hearing on H.R. 3887 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 66, at 102-03
(emphasizing the importance of safe shelter for victims to avoid being re-trafficked); see
also HEATHER J. CLAWSON & LISA GOLDBLATT GRACE, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., FINDING A PATH TO RECOVERY: RESIDENTIAL FACILITIES FOR MINOR VICTIMS OF
DOMESTIC SEX TRAFFICKING (n.d.), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/07/HumanTraffick
ing/ResFac/ib.pdf (discussing safety issues arising from traffickers stalking shelters where
victims are staying). In addition, victims may develop a strong attachment to the trafficker as
“one form of the Stockholm Syndrome—an extreme form of [Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder] otherwise most frequently seen in torture victims”—which may lead a victim to
return to her trafficker. Id.
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B. Consequences of Ineffective Prosecution on the Goal of Preventing Sex
Trafficking
As the second-fastest growing criminal enterprise in the world,271 sex
trafficking is driven by the economic principles of supply and demand.272 In
order to prevent sex trafficking, the economic benefits that appeal to
criminals must be reduced by increasing the costs and risks imposed by
participating in this crime.273 Strong and definite punishment imposes a
significant risk on the industry.274 Lengthy prison sentences are designed to
deter criminals from re-entering the criminal world.275 As a result, Congress
established significant prison terms for sex traffickers, ranging from a
minimum of ten years to life imprisonment.276
Difficulties and uncertainties of federal prosecution of sex trafficking
lead to the referral of cases for prosecution to the state level.277 However,
because most state prison sentences are significantly shorter than those in
the federal system, the deterrent effect is minimized.278 State sentences for
human trafficking violations can be as short as five years.279 The states that
do not have human trafficking statutes prosecute under anti-pimping or
pandering laws.280 These laws can impose a punishment as small as oneyear imprisonment that can be waived in lieu of probation.281 Moreover,
federal punishment is often a more significant deterrent than state-level

271. Sex Trafficking, supra note 8.
272. See Smith & Vardaman, supra note 63, at 266-68 (discussing “[t]he Business of Sex
Trafficking”).
273. For a discussion of economic principles applied to the sex trafficking market, see id.
274. One purpose of punishment is to deter criminals from participating in or repeating
criminal activity. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 26-27 (4th ed. 2003) (discussing
theories of punishment); see also Smith & Vardaman, supra note 63, at 277 (stating that
traffickers will move to jurisdictions that have more lenient human trafficking statutes).
275. See LAFAVE, supra note 274, at 27 (stating that punishment should be an
“unpleasant experience” that will deter the criminal from participating in future criminal
activity).
276. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b) (2012).
277. Combating Modern Slavery: Reauthorization of Anti-Trafficking Programs:
Hearing on H.R. 3887 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 66, at 43 (statement
of Bradley W. Myles, Nat’l Program Director, Polaris Project) (discussing use of local
statutes to prosecute sex traffickers in order to avoid burdensome federal prosecutions).
278. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 22-2705(c)(2) (2010) (no mandatory minimum sentence); see
also LAFAVE, supra note 274, at 29.
279. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 236.1(c) (West 2012).
280. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 176A.100, 201.300 (West 2011).
281. See, e.g., id.
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punishment because parole does not exist in the federal system,282 whereas
state prison systems result in shorter actual imprisonment due to the parole
system.283
In the event that federal prosecution is pursued, prosecutors may be able
to prosecute under 18 U.S.C. § 2423, as opposed to § 1591, but only if the
trafficker actually transported the victim across state lines.284 Because
prosecutors are given wide deference to determine what charges to bring, a
prosecutor will likely choose to indict under a statute with which he is more
familiar.285 If a prosecutor successfully convicts under § 2423, the sex
trafficker will receive a significantly lighter sentence than if the trafficker
had been convicted under § 1591.286 Under the federal sentencing
guidelines, a defendant with no criminal history who is convicted under §
2423 will receive a sentence of at least 120 months.287 The same defendant
convicted under § 1591 would receive a sentence of at least 180 months.288
Electing to prosecute under § 2423 decreases the defendant’s sentence by at
least sixty months.289 Congress recognized the need for harsh punishment of
282. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 214(b), 98 Stat. 1987,
2014 (abolishing parole in the federal system through the repeal of 18 U.S.C. § 5041).
283. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 209.432-209.451 (West 2011); Memorandum
from Rex Reed, Adm’r, Offender Mgmt. Div. of Dep’t of Corr. to Departmental Staff (Jan.
3, 2008), available at http://www.doc.nv.gov/?q=node/80 (discussing how inmates can
decrease the amount of time spent in prison through good behavior and work credit through
the Nevada parole system).
284. Section 2423 criminalizes the transportation of minors across state lines for the
purpose of engaging in criminal sexual activity. 18 U.S.C. § 2423 (2012). If the sex
trafficker crosses state lines, § 2423 will also apply. See id. Prosecutors may choose to bring
charges under both § 1591 and § 2423. See, e.g., United States v. Brooks, 610 F.3d 1186,
1191 (9th Cir. 2010).
285. Peters, supra note 61, at 87.
286. The minimum mandatory punishment for a defendant convicted under § 2423(a) is
ten years, compared to fifteen years under § 1591(b). Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), with 18
U.S.C. § 1591(b). In addition, the federal sentencing guidelines establish the base offense
level for a conviction under § 2423 as twenty-eight, compared to thirty-four for a conviction
under § 1591, which may lead to a substantially lower sentence. U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G1.3 (2012).
287. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a); see also infra note 289.
288. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(1).
289. Compare id., with id. § 2423(a). The difference is calculated by comparing the
minimum required sentence for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2423 (120 months) to the
minimum required sentence for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (180 months), with the
assumption that the defendant does not have a criminal history and the judge sentences to the
minimum possible terms. Notably, the difference in punishment is not only limited to the
length of the prison term. The difference in base levels also impacts the amount of
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sex traffickers when it increased the mandatory penalty to a minimum of
180 months’ imprisonment.290 However, by prosecuting under § 2423, that
need is not realized.
For these reasons, there must be an effective federal statute to secure
prosecution of sex traffickers. Federal prosecution has a greater impact on
reducing the supply in the sex trafficking industry by imposing more
significant risks on traffickers through significant prison terms.291 The
essential goal of preventing sex trafficking is better served and more likely
achieved through federal prosecution.
C. Consequences of Ineffective Federal Prosecution on State Anti-Human
Trafficking Programs
The effectiveness of state human trafficking statutes is affected by the
nature of the federal statute for two reasons. First, many states with human
trafficking statutes modeled their statutes after the Model State AntiTrafficking Criminal Statute (Model Law), created by the DOJ.292 The
Senate encouraged states to use this Model Law when creating their own
anti-trafficking statutes.293 The Model Law mirrors the federal statute,
thereby embodying the inherent ambiguity and resulting consequences.294
Because 92% of human trafficking investigations occur at the state level,295
any challenges presented by the federal statute are likely to also occur in
federally inspired state statutes.
Second, the structure of federal programs often provides guidelines for
states implementing similar programs.296 Because programs supporting
trafficking victims and prosecuting the traffickers were first identified and
permissible fines. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5E1.2(c)(3) (comparing the
fine range of $12,500 to $125,000 for base level twenty-eight with the fine range of $17,500
to $175,000 for base level thirty-four).
290. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248,
sec. 208, § 1591, 120 Stat. 587, 615.
291. Because “[t]he magnitude of the threatened punishment is clearly a factor” in
determining a punishment’s deterring effect, the risks imposed on the trafficker are greater.
See LAFAVE, supra note 274, at 29.
292. MODEL STATE ANTI-TRAFFICKING CRIMINAL STATUTE (2004), available at http://
www.legislationline.org/documents/id/6805.
293. S. RES. 414, 108th Cong. (2004).
294. Compare MODEL STATE ANTI-TRAFFICKING CRIMINAL STATUTE, with 18 U.S.C. §
1591 (2012).
295. DUREN BANKS & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CHARACTERISTICS
OF SUSPECTED HUMAN TRAFFICKING INCIDENTS, 2008-2010, at 4 (Apr. 2011), available at
http:// bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cshti0810.pdf.
296. See, e.g., MODEL STATE ANTI-TRAFFICKING CRIMINAL STATUTE.
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developed at the federal level, some state programs are modeled after the
federal programs.297 Unfortunately, the federal program is underdeveloped
as some prosecutors are electing to prosecute under local laws.298 If the
federal program is undeveloped then states do not have the necessary
guidance to develop better programs. The DOJ recently increased its
training for federal prosecutors and agencies, and similar training is also
made available to state agencies.299 If prosecutors do not use the federal sex
trafficking of a minor statute, the training becomes useless.300 Because most
cases are investigated at the state level,301 any expertise developed in the
federal program is not utilized to prosecute sex traffickers.302
Due to the underdevelopment of these programs, 68% of state and local
prosecutors indicated that human trafficking was not an issue in their
jurisdictions.303 The study noted, however, that a lack of knowledge and
awareness of human trafficking issues may explain why those prosecutors
believed human trafficking did not occur in their jurisdictions.304 As a
result, the programs designed to protect human trafficking victims, prevent
the occurrence of human trafficking, and prosecute the perpetrators are
ineffective. Congress must set the example through a well-designed statute
and fully supporting programs. Because 18 U.S.C. § 1591 is subject to
alternative interpretations,305 Congress should amend the statute to clearly
identify the intended mens rea of the victim’s status as a minor in order to

297. See Combating Modern Slavery: Reauthorization of Anti-Trafficking Programs:
Hearing on H.R. 3887 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 66, at 41 (statement
of Bradley W. Myles, Nat’l Program Director, Polaris Project); see also SHARED HOPE INT’L,
supra note 70, at 117-219 (discussing each state’s law and identifying those that are
comparable to federal legislation). Training opportunities may be increasing. See U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS AND ASSESSMENT OF U.S.
GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES TO COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS: FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 63
(2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/annualreports/tr2009/agreporthuman
trafficking2009.pdf.
298. Peters, supra note 61, at 87; Smith & Vardaman, supra note 63, at 278.
299. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 297, at 63.
300. Training will not yield more effective prosecutions if there are no prosecutions in
the first place. Moreover, any skills learned will not be practiced. Therefore, training is
wasted.
301. BANKS & KYCKELHAHN, supra note 295, at 4.
302. Compare id., with U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 297, at 63.
303. CLAWSON ET AL., supra note 266, at 23.
304. Id.
305. See supra Part II.A.1.
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achieve the stated goals of the TVPA: prevention, protection and
prosecution.306
IV. Determining the Most Effective Mens Rea Standard
The two courts that have addressed the interpretation of 18 U.S.C. §
1591 construed the mens rea of the age of the victim as two conflicting
concepts: one adopting the strict liability approach,307 the other holding that
§ 1591(c) merely provides a method to prove the mens rea for the age of the
victim.308 The question then remains of whether the defendant should be
held liable for the victim’s age, regardless of the defendant’s knowledge or
lack thereof. While many public interest groups promote the adoption of
strict liability,309 others express concern about the implications of imposing
strict liability for a felony carrying such a severe penalty.310
A. Justifications for the Adoption of a Strict Liability Standard
Due to the heinous nature of the crime of sex trafficking of minors,
public policy cries out for strict liability.311 In fact, the 2008 amendment to
the TVPA proposed by Congressman Chris Smith, called for strict
liability.312 Congressman Smith was concerned with the prevalence of
forced prostitution and wanted to take all steps to eradicate the practice.313
However, others involved in the drafting of anti-trafficking legislation were
306. See Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 102, 114
Stat. 1464, 1466.
307. United States v. Robinson, 702 F.3d. 22, 26 (2d Cir. 2012).
308. United States v. Wilson, No. 10-60102-CR, 2010 WL 2991561, at *7-8 (S.D. Fla.
July 27, 2010).
309. See, e.g., Model Provisions of Comprehensive State Legislation to Combat Human
Trafficking: Commentary, POLARIS PROJECT 11, available at http://www.polarisproject.org/
storage/documents/policy_documents/cml%20commentary%20edition%203%20final%20w
out%20links.pdf (last visited June 12, 2013); CTR. FOR WOMEN POLICY STUDIES, NAT’L INST.
ON STATE POLICY ON TRAFFICKING OF WOMEN AND GIRLS, RESOURCE GUIDE FOR STATE
LEGISLATORS: MODEL PROVISIONS FOR STATE ANTI-TRAFFICKING LAWS 3 (2005), available
at http://www.centerwomenpolicy.org/pdfs/TraffickingResourceGuide.pdf [hereinafter
RESOURCE GUIDE FOR STATE LEGISLATORS: MODEL PROVISIONS FOR STATE ANTITRAFFICKING LAWS] (proposing statutory language that lacks a mens rea requirement for the
victim’s age).
310. See, e.g., Letter from Brian A. Benczkowski to John Conyers, Jr., supra note 138, at
8.
311. Infra IV.A.4. (discussing various public policy groups advocating for strict
liability).
312. Bill Summary & Status: H.R. 3887, supra note 129.
313. Peters, supra note 61, at 45-47.
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concerned that Congressman Smith’s focus on sex trafficking ignored labor
trafficking.314 A series of compromises and revisions resulted in the
ambiguous language that was ultimately passed.315
Several arguments support an adoption of the strict liability standard,
originally advocated for by Congressman Smith, in order to effectively
prosecute sex traffickers and eradicate the practice of human trafficking.
First, applying strict liability to the crime of sex trafficking would not be a
radical change from well-established crimes, such as statutory rape. Second,
the imposition of strict liability does not result in criminalizing otherwise
legal conduct. Third, congressional intent appears to support the strict
liability standard. Finally, most public interest groups and nongovernmental
organizations that work with trafficking victims support the adoption of the
strict liability standard.
1. Similar Strict Liability Sex Crime: Statutory Rape316
The TVPA did not necessarily create new crimes, but rather adapted preestablished crimes to be more effective at fighting human trafficking.317
Before 2000, sex trafficking was punished through statutes criminalizing
actions such as kidnapping or extortion.318 Even today, defendants are often
charged with other crimes in addition to sex trafficking, such as prostitution
or drug trafficking.319 The principles behind these pre-established crimes
should be considered when determining what the mens rea requirement
should be in sex trafficking of minors laws.320
At its core, sex trafficking of a minor is sexual assault.321 Whether the
trafficker actually commits the sexual assault or causes the sexual assault
through the solicitation of clients, the heart of the crime is “sexual
intercourse [or sexual contact] with another person who does not
314. Id. at 47-50.
315. Bill Summary & Status: H.R. 3887, supra note 129.
316. The TVPA recognized that sex trafficking incorporates the elements of other crimes,
such as forcible rape, kidnapping, and fraud. 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(9)-(10) (2012). Congress
noted that those laws were inadequate to eliminate human trafficking. Id. § 7101(b)(14)(15). Consequently, Congress passed 18 U.S.C. § 1591 to provide appropriate punishment
for sex traffickers. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b).
317. Peters, supra note 61, at 59-61.
318. Id.
319. See FARRELL ET AL., supra note 60, at 77-78.
320. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 273 (1952) (considering common law
treatment of crime in order to determine mens rea of statute).
321. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(3), with Sexual Assault, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
131 (9th ed. 2009).
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consent.”322 Every state imposes criminal liability for sexual intercourse or
sexual contact with a minor under an identified age, commonly called
statutory rape.323 Most states make statutory rape a strict liability offense.324
Very few states require any mens rea or “consciousness of wrongdoing.”325
The imposition of strict liability for sexual intercourse or contact with a
minor rests on two principles: (1) regardless of the minor’s voluntary
participation in the act, the minor lacks capacity to consent due to age, and
(2) the state has an interest in enforcing morality and protecting its minor
citizens.326
Similar principles apply to the crime of sex trafficking of a minor. The
federal government maintains sincere interests in enforcing sex trafficking
laws to protect children from abuse and in protecting its citizens from
crime.327 First, similar to statutory rape laws, children lack the capacity to
consent to commercial sex acts and should be protected from engaging in
commercial sex acts “in an uninformed manner, thereby exposing
themselves to physical and emotional harm.”328 Second, sex trafficking is a
criminal industry, driven by the economic theory of supply and demand.329
While the federal government can prosecute those who seek commercial
sex acts performed by minors (representing the “demand” in the
commercial sex industry), investigating and prosecuting those who provide
the supply constitutes a more effective method of preventing sex
trafficking.330 Moreover, criminal enterprises do not exist in a vacuum.
Human traffickers often participate in other crimes as well, such as drug
trafficking.331
322. Sexual Assault, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 131 (9th ed. 2009); see MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.11(3)(a) (indicating that children cannot give effective consent because they are
considered legally incompetent).
323. ASAPH GLOSSER ET AL., LEWIN GRP., STATUTORY RAPE: A GUIDE TO STATE LAWS
AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 6-7 (2004), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/08/sr/
statelaws/report.pdf; Statutory Rape, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1374 (9th ed. 2009).
324. See Catherine L. Carpenter, On Statutory Rape, Strict Liability, and the Public
Welfare Offense Model, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 313, app. (2003) (identifying states that impose
strict liability through the public welfare offense model and hybrid model).
325. Id. at 345, app. (identifying states that require some scienter element to be convicted
of statutory rape under the true crime model).
326. Id. at 334-35.
327. See 22 U.S.C. § 7101(a) (2012).
328. LAFAVE, supra note 274, at 875.
329. Sex Trafficking, supra note 8; see Smith & Vardaman, supra note 63, at 265-66
(discussing “[t]he Business of Sex Trafficking”).
330. Contra Smith & Vardaman, supra note 63, at 266-68.
331. See FARRELL ET AL., supra note 60, at 77-78.
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2. No Criminalization of Otherwise Legal Conduct
There is another aspect to the comparison of statutory rape and sex
trafficking that strengthens the argument for strict liability. In some cases,
statutory rape laws may hold a person criminally liable for a felony even
though he acted with an innocent mind.332 For example, a person could
engage in consensual sexual activity with another whom he reasonably
believed to be an adult based on the person’s statements and actions.333 In
most states, criminal liability is imposed even if the minor claims to have
consented because, legally, minors lack the capacity to consent.334
Therefore, in some cases of statutory rape, what the defendant may have
reasonably perceived as consensual, innocent conduct with a person of age
becomes criminal through the imposition of strict liability based solely on
the minor’s age.335
The Supreme Court cautioned about this type of strict liability with
crimes bearing significant punishment in United States v. X-Citement
Video, Inc.336 The Court interpreted the statute prohibiting the shipping,
receipt, distribution, or reproduction of child pornography as including a
scienter requirement specifically because it was knowledge of the age of the
person depicted in the pornography that distinguished “legal innocence
from wrongful conduct.”337 In a statutory rape case, innocent conduct
(where a defendant reasonably believed that the person was of age and was
able to give valid consent) could lead to criminal liability without a mens
rea requirement.338
However, in the case of sex trafficking, the victim’s age does not
distinguish legal innocence from wrongful conduct. Regardless of the
victim’s age, the act of “recruit[ing], entic[ing], . . . transport[ing],
provid[ing], obtain[ing], or maintain[ing] . . . a person” who will be caused
“to engage in a commercial sex act” is a crime.339 While the federal statute
requires force, fraud, or coercion to be convicted of sex trafficking if the
332. See Carpenter, supra note 324, at app.
333. Id. at 335. Notably, statutory rape laws acknowledge that the minor may have
participated consensually. Id.
334. Id. at 334.
335. Id. at 350.
336. 513 U.S. 64, 71-73 (1994).
337. Id. at 66, 73 (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)).
338. See Carpenter, supra note 324, at 333 (“[E]ngaging in sexual activity is risky
business. Implicit in the risk the actor assumes is that sexual intercourse, even between
consenting adults, may be proscribed by statute.”).
339. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (2012); see also, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-5609 (2004).
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victim is over the age of eighteen, a defendant causing a person to engage
in a commercial sex act without force, fraud, or coercion can often be
prosecuted under anti-pimping or pandering laws at the state level.340 The
underlying conduct of causing a person to engage in a commercial sex act is
prohibited by law.341 There is no underlying innocent conduct.
Critics of strict-liability crimes are often concerned with the concept of
convicting a person of a serious crime without a culpable state of mind.342
In a statutory rape case, it is easy to imagine the scenario of the nineteenyear-old boy engaging in consensual sexual intercourse with a seventeenyear-old girl who he reasonably believed was eighteen years old. This type
of fact pattern may justify critics’ concerns about holding a person
criminally liable for a felony that was committed without a culpable
mind.343 But those concerns simply are not present in a sex trafficking case.
Regardless of age or consent, the defendant must have a culpable state of
mind. He must have the intent of causing the person to be engaged in a
commercial sex act, an intent that must be proven by the prosecution.344
Essentially, the minority status of the victim becomes a “‘jurisdictional
fact’ that enhances an offense otherwise committed with an evil intent.”345
Any concern that a defendant would be convicted of a serious felony
without a culpable mind is misplaced.
3. Congressional Intent
In addition to considering the common law background against which
the federal statute was passed, congressional intent must be considered
when determining whether a strict liability standard should be adopted.
When the bill amending 18 U.S.C. § 1591 passed in the House of
Representatives, Congressman Berman explained that “the prosecution will
be exempted from having to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a
defendant who had a reasonable opportunity to observe the person . . . knew
that the person had not attained the age of 18 years.”346 The amendment was
inspired by the Supreme Court’s footnote in X-Citement Video noting that

340. See, e.g., W.VA. CODE § 61-8-8 (2010); see also sources cited supra n. 202
341. See, e.g., id. (prohibiting knowingly supporting oneself via a prostitute’s earnings).
342. LAFAVE, supra note 274, at 279.
343. Id.; see Carpenter, supra note 324, at 340-41.
344. 18 U.S.C. § 1591.
345. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 n.3 (1994) (citing United
States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975)).
346. 154 CONG. REC. H10904 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 2008) (statement of Rep. Howard
Berman).
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the presumption of mens rea excludes sex offenses.347 Congressman
Berman added that the decision to relieve the government of its burden of
proving the defendant knew the victim was under the age of eighteen years
brought the statute in line with similar criminal statutes, specifically the
federal statutory rape statute found in the Mann Act, which is a strict
liability felony when committed against a child less than twelve years of
age.348
In addition, the Congressional Research Service supports an
interpretation of congressional support for strict liability by stating, “[The
amendment] absolves the government from having to prove that a trafficker
actually knew the age of a child victim, as long as it shows that he had a
reasonable chance to observe the victim.”349 Based on the legislative
history, Congress most likely intended § 1591 to hold the defendant strictly
liable for the age of the victim.350
Legislatures often resort to creating strict liability crimes when
convictions are hard to obtain due to challenges in proving mens rea.351
This may be especially true in human trafficking cases. In a national survey,
prosecutors stated that a human trafficking case is “rarely successful”
without victim testimony.352 A number of factors can impact whether a
victim will testify, including fears of retaliation, threats to families,353 and
other prosecutorial factors, such as lengths of sentences and likelihoods of
conviction.354
Testimony by children raises additional concerns. Children, while
presumed competent,355 may have challenges communicating their
347. Id.; see X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 72 n.2.
348. 154 CONG. REC. H10904 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 2008) (statement of Rep. Howard
Berman) (citing United States v. Jones, 471 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 2006)).
349. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40190, THE WILLIAM WILBERFORCE
TRAFFICKING VICTIMS PROTECTION REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2008 (P.L. NO. 110-457):
CRIMINAL LAW PROVISIONS 7 (2009), available at http://niwaplibrary.wcl.american.edu/
reference/additional-materials/vawa-legislative-history/trafficking-victims-protection-actand-reauthorization/congressional-research-service-reports-tvpa-and-tvpras/TVPRA%20
CRS%20Report.pdf (last visited June 13, 2013).
350. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
351. LAFAVE, supra note 274, at 273.
352. CLAWSON ET AL., supra note 266, at vi.
353. See FARRELL ET AL., supra note 60, at 83-84.
354. Combating Modern Slavery: Reauthorization of Anti-Trafficking Programs:
Hearing on H.R. 3887 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 66, at 94 (statement
of Ms. Florrie Burke, Safe Haven).
355. FED. R. EVID. 601 (stating that every person is presumed to be competent, regardless
of age).
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testimony in an effective or credible manner.356 In addition, the impact of
testifying on a child victim may create challenges in deciding whether a
child victim should testify.357 Child victims of sexual assault were more
likely to be re-traumatized by the process of testifying in criminal court,
demonstrating signs of distress several months after the trial.358 The
Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized a compelling interest in
“protect[ing] . . . minor victims of sex crimes from further trauma and
embarrassment.”359 Because of the impact on child victims and the resulting
challenge in prosecuting a human trafficking case that relies significantly
on victim testimony, the legislature may find a strict liability standard
appropriate in sex trafficking of a minor cases.
4. Public Support for the Adoption of the Strict Liability Standard
Most public interest groups encourage the adoption of the strict liability
standard for the age of the victim.360 The United Nations’ Model Law
against Trafficking in Persons does not expressly require the prosecution to
prove that the defendant knew that the person recruited was a minor.361
Rather, force, fraud, or coercion is assumed when the victim is a child.362
The prosecution must only prove exploitation—that the child was caused to
participate in a commercial sex act.363 Any additional showing of the

356. 5 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 8:116
(3d ed. 2007).
357. Christianna M. Lamb, The Child Witness and the Law: The United States’ Judicial
Response to the Commercial, Sexual Exploitation of Children in Light of the UN Convention
on the Rights of the Child, 3 OR. REV. INT’L L. 63, 70-71 (2001).
358. Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association in Support of Neither
Party at *9, Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (No. 89-478), 1990 WL 10013093, at
*9 (“The testifying children’s distress was mainly manifested in greater depression, anxiety,
and psychosomatic symptoms.”).
359. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982); see also Craig,
497 U.S. at 852 (collecting cases).
360. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, MODEL LAW AGAINST
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 37 (2009) [hereinafter MODEL LAW AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN
PERSONS], available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/Model_Law_
against_TIP. pdf; Model Provisions of Comprehensive State Legislation to Combat Human
Trafficking: Commentary, supra note 309, at 11; RESOURCE GUIDE FOR STATE LEGISLATORS:
MODEL PROVISIONS FOR STATE ANTI-TRAFFICKING LAWS, supra note 309, at 3.
361. See MODEL LAW AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, supra note 360, at 37.
362. Id. (specifying human trafficking of a child without a mens rea element).
363. Id. at 35-36, 39 (defining “exploitation” and applying that definition to child
victims).
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defendant’s knowledge of the age of the minor is unnecessary.364 Similarly,
the age of the victim may increase the sentencing range for the defendant
simply “if . . . the circumstance[] [is] present.”365
The Polaris Project, a nongovernmental organization dedicated to ending
human trafficking, partners with the federal government and its entities
through grant-funded programs.366 In addition to operating the National
Human Trafficking Resource Center hotline, the Polaris Project often
serves as a consultant for Congress and agencies within the federal
government.367 Through its lobbying efforts, the Polaris Project advocates
for adoption of model anti-trafficking laws.368 Citing statutory rape laws
and international law, the model laws do not require a showing that the
defendant knew the victim’s age.369 In commentary, the Polaris Project
argued that the strict liability standard does not raise constitutional concerns
when the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the victim
because “there is no policy reason to protect those who . . . are aware they
are supporting the commercial sexual exploitation of another person which
is already a crime in most states.”370
The National Institute on State Policy on Trafficking of Women and
Girls of the Center for Women Policy Studies endorsed similar
provisions.371 The age of the minor is a sentencing enhancement factor; the
defendant need not know that the victim was under the age of eighteen
years to either be convicted of sex trafficking or receive the sentencing
enhancement.372

364. See id. at 37 (specifying human trafficking of a child without a mens rea element).
365. Id. at 39.
366. See National Human Trafficking Resource Center, POLARIS PROJECT, http://www.
polarisproject.org/what-we-do/national-human-trafficking-hotline/the-nhtrc/overview (last
visited June 16, 2013).
367. See, e.g., Combating Modern Slavery: Reauthorization of Anti-Trafficking
Programs: Hearing on H.R. 3887 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 66, at
40-46 (statement of Bradley W. Myles, Nat’l Program Director, Polaris Project).
368. Model Provisions of Comprehensive State Legislation to Combat Human
Trafficking, POLARIS PROJECT, http://www.polarisproject.org/what-we-do/policy-advocacy/
capacity-building/model-provisions-of-comprehensive-state-legislation-to-combat-humantrafficking (last visited July 7, 2013).
369. Model Provisions of Comprehensive State Legislation to Combat Human
Trafficking: Commentary, supra note 309, at 11.
370. Id.
371. See RESOURCE GUIDE FOR STATE LEGISLATORS: MODEL PROVISIONS FOR STATE
ANTI-TRAFFICKING LAWS, supra note 309.
372. Id. at 3.
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In addition, a number of states have adopted the strict liability standard.
Of the thirty-two jurisdictions with sex trafficking of minors statutes,373
nineteen hold the defendant responsible for the minor’s age by either
adopting the strict liability standard or prohibiting the defense of mistake of
age.374 Only one state specifically requires the prosecution to prove the
defendant knew the victim’s age.375 The remaining twelve jurisdictions with
sex trafficking of minors statutes model their laws after the federal sex
trafficking statutes, thereby embodying the inherent ambiguities.376 Eight
states with trafficking statutes do not specify a different statute or penalty
for those who traffic minors.377 The remaining eleven states do not have
trafficking statutes and typically prosecute under a pandering, compelling
prostitution, or kidnapping statute.378
A strong majority supports the adoption of a strict liability standard for
the mens rea of the age of the minor. A strict liability standard would
facilitate more effective prosecutions and make greater strides towards
abolishing the sex trafficking industry. However, the drawbacks to the strict
liability standard must be considered as well.

373. This number includes thirty-one states and the District of Columbia.
374. CAL. PENAL CODE § 236.1 (West 2010); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-502 (2010); FLA.
STAT. § 787.06 (2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-46 (2011); IOWA CODE § 710A.2 (2012);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5426 (2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 529.100 (West 2007); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 4A (2011); MINN. STAT. § 609.322 (2009); MO. REV. STAT. § 566.212
(2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 633:7 (2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-43.13 (2006); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-40-01 (2009); 21 OKLA. STAT. § 867 (2011); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3002
(2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-67-6 (2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-49-2 (2011); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-13-309 (2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-310 (West 2008).
375. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 787 (2007).
376. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1307 (2010); D.C. CODE § 22-1834 (2010); 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/10-9 (2010); IND. CODE § 35-42-3.5-1 (2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:46.3
(2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.462g (2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-54.1 (2006); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 28-831 (2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-52-1 (2008); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
20A.02 (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2652 (2011); WIS. STAT. § 948.051 (2011).
377. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-152 (2010); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.360 (2012); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 5-11-108 (2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-192a (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-8
(WEST 2005); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.34 (McKinney 2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2905.32
(West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.40.100 (2011).
378. HAW. REV. STAT. § 712-1203 (2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-5609 (1994); ME. REV.
STAT. tit. 17-A, § 301 (2009); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 11-303 (WEST 2011); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-5-602 (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.300 (1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 167.017
(2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-415 (2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-47 (2009); W. VA. CODE
§ 61-8-8 (2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-4-103 (1993).
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B. Concerns Weighing Against the Adoption of a Strict Liability Standard
While the public outcry demands strict liability for sex trafficking,379
long established principles of criminal law may prevent the adoption of a
strict liability standard for this crime.380
Offenses without a mens rea requirement “generally are disfavored.”381
Common law requires some level of mens rea.382 A person cannot be
punished for a crime at common law without at least acting with
negligence.383 However, as statutory law has developed, strict liability has
gained a strong foothold in certain types of crimes.384 Strict liability is often
reserved for public welfare offenses385 or for crimes that carry a light
penalty, usually less than one-year imprisonment, such as misdemeanors.386
The Model Penal Code limits strict liability to violations punishable only by
a civil penalty, such as a fine or forfeiture.387 Furthermore, the Model Penal
Code dictates that strict liability should not be applied to offenses that give
“rise to any disability or legal disadvantage based on conviction of a
criminal offense.”388 Many scholars and commentators have expressed
concerns about punishing a person without demonstrating a culpable state
of mind.389
The DOJ expressed these concerns regarding the proposed 2008
amendment to the TVPA, stating that removing the knowledge requirement
combined with the mandatory minimum sentence of ten years “would
create a rare circumstance wherein there is a substantial mandatory
minimum sentence for an already unusual strict liability crime.”390 While
379. See discussion supra Part IV.A.4.
380. For example, at common law, strict liability crimes were prohibited. Staples v.
United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994) (citing United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S.
422, 436-37 (1978)).
381. Id. at 606 (citing Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985)).
382. Id. at 605 (citing U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 436).
383. LAFAVE, supra note 274, at 272.
384. For example, strict liability is typical for “public welfare offenses” and statutory
rape. See Carpenter, supra note 324, at 322-32.
385. Id. (discussing the public welfare offense doctrine from the perspective of its
potential application to statutory rape laws).
386. LAFAVE, supra note 274, at 272-73.
387. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.04(5) (2011).
388. Id.
389. See, e.g., Alan C. Michaels, Constitutional Innocence, 112 HARV. L. REV. 828
(1999); Richard A. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REV. 731
(1960).
390. Letter from Brian A. Benczkowski to John Conyers, Jr., supra note 138, at 8.
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not explicitly stated by Congress, these types of concerns may have
motivated the changes made to Representative Smith’s original strict
liability proposal.391 Concerns about imposing such a severe punishment of
up to life imprisonment for a crime where the defendant neither knew the
victim’s age nor had an opportunity to ascertain the victim’s age may have
motivated the changes.392
Moreover, not all prostitutes are coerced into the sex industry.393 Many
enter the industry voluntarily.394 To impose strict liability on a defendant
who panders a prostitute, who while age seventeen claims to be age twenty,
would offend the idea of imposing punishment only on a person with a
culpable state of mind.395 A defendant could reasonably believe that the
person he is pandering is an adult.396 But that underlying conduct of
pandering is still illegal.397 However, a defendant convicted of pandering
may only face up to five years in prison compared with possible life
imprisonment if convicted of sex trafficking.398 Such a difference in prison
terms for the same conduct should not be accepted lightly.399 It would be
unfair to impose such a significant increase in punishment on a person who
reasonably believed that he was working with an adult.
The DOJ also noted that the creation of a strict liability crime may lead
to “legal challenges.”400 One defendant charged with sex trafficking
advanced an Eighth Amendment challenge, alleging that the imposition of
391. See Bill Summary & Status: H.R. 3887, supra note 129.
392. Model Provisions of Comprehensive State Legislation to Combat Human
Trafficking: Commentary, supra note 309, at 11.
393. Ronald Weitzer, The Social Construction of Sex Trafficking: Ideology and
Institutionalization of a Moral Crusade, 35 POL. & SOC’Y 447, 453 (2007), available at
http://myweb.dal.ca/mgoodyea/Documents/Migration%20studies/The%20social%20constru
ction%20of%20sex%20trafficking%20Weitzer%20Pol%20Soc%202007%20%2035(3)%20
%20447-475.pdf.
394. Id.
395. See Wasserstrom, supra note 389, at 731 (“The imposition of severe criminal
sanctions in the absence of any requisite mental element has been held by many to be
incompatible with the basic requirements of our Anglo-American, and, indeed, any civilized
jurisprudence.” (footnote omitted)).
396. See Carpenter, supra note 324, at 352.
397. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 11-303 (West 2011).
398. Compare, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 4A (2011), and WYO. STAT. ANN. § 64-103 (West 2013), with 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b) (2012) (establishing punishment ranging from
a minimum of ten years imprisonment to life imprisonment, based on the minor’s age).
399. See Michaels, supra note 389, at 841 (“[C]riminal punishment must be predicated
on some independent culpability . . . .”).
400. Letter from Brian A. Benczkowski to John Conyers, Jr., supra note 138, at 8.
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strict liability constituted a violation of the constitutional protection against
cruel and unusual punishment.401 Even though the Supreme Court has only
held one strict liability crime unconstitutional,402 18 U.S.C. § 1591 should
strive to embody the constitutional protections advanced by the framers of
the Bill of Rights.403 Simply because the statute would probably not be held
unconstitutional on Eighth Amendment grounds does not render strict
liability necessary or appropriate for this type of felony.
Principles of fairness may prevent the adoption of the strict liability
standard. The philosophy on which the American criminal legal system is
based dictates that strict liability should not be imposed for any felony,
especially one with such a severe punishment.404 While not applying the
strict liability standard may make prosecutions more challenging,
embracing a fair and just criminal system should overcome the desire to
ease the burden on the prosecution.405
V. Proposed Changes to 18 U.S.C. § 1591
After careful review of the arguments presented for and against strict
liability for the age of the minor in prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 1591,
the author proposes the following changes.
First, the current language of § 1591(c) should be stricken from the
statute. In its place, subsection (c) should read:
In a prosecution under subsection (a) of this section, the
Government need not prove that the defendant knew or
recklessly disregarded the fact that the person so recruited,
enticed, harbored, transported, provided, obtained or maintained,
had not attained the age of 14 years. If the person so recruited,
enticed, harbored, transported, provided, obtained or maintained
had attained the age of 14 years but had not attained the age of
18 years, it is a defense, which the defendant must establish by a

401. United States v. Wilson, No. 10-60102-CR, 2010 WL 2991561, at *10-11 (S.D. Fla.
July 27, 2010); see also supra text accompanying notes 98-101. The constitutional challenge
was dismissed on ripeness grounds because the defendant had not yet been sentenced.
Wilson, 2010 WL 2991561, at *10-11.
402. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 229-30 (1957) (holding that strict liability
was inappropriate in felon registration statute because of notice issues).
403. United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 199 (1957) (“[A] restrictive meaning
must be given if a broader meaning would generate constitutional doubts.”).
404. Michaels, supra note 389, at 841.
405. See generally id.
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preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant reasonably
believed that the person had attained the age of 18 years.
With this proposal, strict liability will be imposed if the victim is under
the age of fourteen years. However, the government must prove that the
defendant knew or recklessly disregarded the age of the victim if the victim
is at least fourteen years old but less than eighteen years old.406 If the victim
was at least fourteen years old but less than eighteen years old, the
defendant may defend on the basis that he reasonably believed the victim to
be at least eighteen years old. These changes reflect a compromise between
the opposing views on strict liability in this context while providing an
effective platform for Congress to achieve its goals of eradicating sex
trafficking.
This compromise avoids the concerns resulting from severely punishing
a defendant pandering a person—whom he reasonably believed to be an
adult—who voluntarily entered the sex industry. The defendant in this
situation could advance a reasonable mistake-of-age defense, which could
be plausible when the minor is over the age of fourteen years.407 However,
the plausibility of a reasonable mistake-of-age defense significantly
decreases when the victim is less than fourteen years of age.408 Essentially,
when the victim is less than fourteen years of age, it is no longer plausible
that the victim entered the industry voluntarily or that the defendant
reasonably believed the victim was at least eighteen years of age.
Therefore, strict liability can be imposed without offending the concerns of
punishing a person without a culpable state of mind.409
While the reckless disregard mens rea may reach the same result as strict
liability when the victim is under the age of fourteen years,410 the strict
406. The age of fourteen years is selected because a girl typically experiences puberty by
that time. See Puberty & Precocious Puberty: Overview, NAT’L INST. OF CHILD HEALTH &
HUMAN DEV., http://www.nichd.nih.gov/health/topics/puberty/Pages/default.aspx (last
updated Apr. 3, 2013). During puberty, a girl experiences growth spurts and breast
development, causing her appearance to resemble an adult.
407. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 2423(g) (2012), codifies a reasonable mistake-of-age
defense for the crime of transportation of minors.
408. The plausibility that a defendant reasonably believed a child less than fourteen years
old was actually an adult diminishes because a reasonable person would not observe a child
less than fourteen years old and believe she was an adult. In this case, the defendant can bear
the “risk of error” if he unreasonably believes a young child is an adult. See United States v.
X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 76 n.5 (1994).
409. This situation avoids criminalizing otherwise legal conduct. See id. at 73.
410. Reckless disregard could probably be found by a showing that, because the victim
was less than fourteen years of age, the defendant could not have reasonably believed that
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liability standard promotes Congress’s goal of protecting the victim. Victim
testimony is key to successful sex trafficking prosecutions.411 However,
testifying can re-traumatize the victim, a risk that increases if the victim is a
younger child.412 By imposing strict liability when the child is under the age
of fourteen years, the child may not have to testify, or the amount of
testimony required of the child may be reduced.413 Furthermore, crossexamination of the child will be significantly limited. The victim’s conduct
and actions become less important as the key element to prove will be
whether the defendant caused the victim to engage in a commercial sex
activity. For example, the victim will not need to testify about her
reputation or prior sexual history (or lack thereof). Rather, her testimony
will be limited to the commercial sex activity itself. With less testimony
required from the child, the trauma on the child will be reduced. Therefore,
Congress’s goal of prosecution can be advanced, while focus remains on
the protection of the child-victim.
The above compromise also brings § 1591 more closely in line with
current statutes.414 Congress specifically cited 18 U.S.C. § 2241 as
inspiration for its draft of § 1591.415 Subsection (d) of § 2241 imposes strict
liability for the offense of aggravated sexual abuse by relieving the
government of its burden to prove that the defendant knew the victim was
younger than twelve years old.416 However, this subsection has not raised
the concern that a defendant could reasonably believe the person engaged in
the sexual act was an adult because the age at which strict liability is
imposed is less than twelve years old.417 Also, § 2241 requires the
defendant know that the person was not an adult, as opposed to offering the
option of proving that the defendant recklessly disregarded the person’s
age.418 While § 1591 was inspired by § 2241, the differences in the statutes
the victim was an adult. See, e.g., Special Verdict Form, United States v. Robinson, No. 09CR-794 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2010) (finding that the defendant recklessly disregarded the age
of the minor when she was seventeen years of age).
411. See CLAWSON ET AL., supra note 266, at vi.
412. See Lamb, supra note 357, at 70-71.
413. Because the government would not be required to prove the defendant knew or
recklessly disregarded the minor’s age, the government may be able to present evidence
other than the child victim’s testimony to prove the other elements.
414. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2423 (2012).
415. 154 CONG. REC. H10904 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 2008) (statement of Rep. Howard
Berman).
416. 18 U.S.C. § 2241(d).
417. See id.
418. Id. § 2241(c).
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have led to the concerns raised by the current version of § 1591. The
proposed compromise makes § 1591 more consistent with § 2241 by
lowering the age of the victim at which strict liability is imposed from
eighteen years of age to fourteen years of age.
The reasonable mistake-of-age defense was inspired by 18 U.S.C. §
2423.419 Criminalizing the transportation of minors with the intent to
engage in illicit sexual conduct or criminal sexual activity under § 2423
requires that the defendant have knowledge that the person transported was
a minor.420 The reasonable mistake-of-age defense is included to avoid
punishing those who reasonably believed the person transported was an
adult.421 Similar scenarios could arise with cases charged under § 2423 and
§ 1591.422 For example, the person transported or caused to engage in a
commercial sex activity could assert that she is an adult by stating her age
as older than eighteen years or by participating in activities typically
reserved for adults, such as purchasing alcohol or cigarettes. In these cases,
it would be unfair to impose such an increase in punishment when the
defendant reasonably believed the person was an adult. By including a
reasonable mistake-of-age defense in the proposed compromise, that
scenario can be avoided.
Finally, the above compromise represents the best statutory scheme to
further Congress’s goal of prosecuting severe forms of trafficking while
appeasing those on both sides of the political issue. Those who advance the
strict liability standard will see that those who traffic children younger than
fourteen years of age are justly punished without offending the principles of
those who believe that a person should not be punished without a culpable
state of mind. The proposed compromise will be less likely to succumb to
constitutional challenges because the same result under a strict liability
standard could be met with a reckless disregard standard, albeit with more
implications for the victim.423
The proposed compromise seeks to balance the arguments for and
against strict liability while remaining dedicated to the TVPA’s goals of
protection, prevention, and prosecution. By imposing strict liability only
against those defendants trafficking children younger than age fourteen, the
goal of protecting the victim is served by not requiring extensive testimony
419. See id. § 2423(g).
420. See id. § 2423(a), (b).
421. See id.
422. See, e.g., United States v. Brooks, 610 F.3d 1186, 1191 (9th Cir. 2010).
423. For example, under the reckless disregard standard, the child victim would most
likely be required to testify. See CLAWSON ET AL., supra note 266, at vi.
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from the child. Additionally, requiring the prosecution to prove the
defendant knew or recklessly disregarded the victim’s age when the victim
is older than age fourteen avoids the concerns regarding the imposition of
strict liability for a severe felony on a less culpable mind.424 With an
unambiguous federal statute, the goal of prevention can be met through
effective prosecutions of sex traffickers, thereby taking a necessary step
toward abolishing sex trafficking.
VI. Conclusion
Lydia, Lina, and Tina425 are fortunate survivors of sex trafficking. Lydia
was eventually recognized as a victim of sex trafficking and given the
services she needed, although her traffickers were never charged with sex
trafficking.426 Lina managed to escape with the help of her friend, Sinan.427
With the help of the International Justice Mission and the Siem Reap AntiHuman Trafficking Police, the other women and children kept in the same
brothel were rescued and all received care and counseling.428 Tina escaped
from her life of forced prostitution and currently advocates on behalf of
victims of sex trafficking.429
Congress’s three goals of protection, prevention, and prosecution are
aimed at preventing children, like Lydia, Lina, and Tina, from living these
horrendous stories.430 While there may be disagreements on how to
effectuate these goals, parties on both sides of the argument agree on one
thing: no person or child should be forced to engage in a commercial sex
activity.431 In its current ambiguous state, 18 U.S.C. § 1591 does not
advance the goals of prevention, protection, and prosecution. Each year that
§ 1591 remains ambiguous, an estimated 100,000 children in the United
States are taken from their homes and forced into the commercial sex
424. The defendant would be less culpable because he reasonably believed the person
trafficked was an adult. However, the defendant could still be prosecuted under other
statutes, such as 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a), if force, fraud, or coercion was used.
425. See discussion supra Part I.
426. 146 CONG. REC. H26831 (daily ed. May 9, 2000) (statement of Rep. Chris Smith).
427. IJM Cambodia: Brave Survivors Help Rescue Girls from Brothel, supra note 11.
428. Id.
429. Frundt, supra note 28.
430. See Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 102, 114
Stat. 1464, 1466-69.
431. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 7101(a) (2012); MODEL LAW AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN
PERSONS, supra note 360; Model Provisions of Comprehensive State Legislation to Combat
Human Trafficking: Commentary, supra note 309; RESOURCE GUIDE FOR STATE
LEGISLATORS: MODEL PROVISIONS FOR STATE ANTI-TRAFFICKING LAWS, supra note 309.
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industry.432 The power to eradicate the second-largest criminal industry in
the world lies within Congress’s reach. By amending § 1591 to eliminate
ambiguities, Congress can advance its goals of preventing a child from
being taken from her home and forced to endure the pain and suffering of
being trafficked into the sex industry, protecting the children that have
already been trafficked, and prosecuting those who engage in this heinous
crime.
Tiffanie N. Choate

432. Smith et al., supra note 253, at iv.
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